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1915 
The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional 
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain 
Meaning 
[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary.  
 —Judge Learned Hand1 
The judicial conception of lexical meaning—i.e., what judges 
think about what words mean, or, more importantly, how judges 
arrive at the meaning of contested terms—is often outcome 
determinative. Vast fortunes or years of confinement may balance 
precariously on the interpretation of a single word. When faced with 
hard cases2—cases in which contextual cues or legislative definitions 
do not decisively favor either party’s asserted meaning—judges, like 
many speakers of English, will cast about for interpretive tools, often 
“looking for comfortable reassurance” in one of the language’s 
“more firmly established and dependably stable institutions”—the 
English dictionary.3 Such dictionaries, said Justice Jackson, are “the 
last resort of the baffled judge.”4 
Baffled or not, judges cannot escape the reverence with which 
society regards its dictionaries—a reverence that often borders on the 
devotional.5 Indeed, the dictionary is sometimes spoken of as a 
 
 1. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 2. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) (defining 
“hard cases” as those in which “no settled rule dictates a decision either way”); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 211–12 (2008) (“[D]ifficult cases . . . are so mainly because 
they are cases in which the orthodox materials of legal decision making cannot produce a 
satisfactory decision.”).  
 3. RANDOLPH QUIRK, STYLE AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 86 
(1982). 
 4. Jordon v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 5. JONATHON GREEN, CHASING THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE 
DICTIONARIES THEY MADE xiii (1997) (“The lexicographer, the interpreter and arbiter of the 
very language that underpins every aspect of communication, is far more deity than drudge. Or 
if not a deity, then certainly a priest, charged by society—whether consciously or not—with the 
revelation of the linguistic verities.”); QUIRK, supra note 3, at 86–87 (“The time-hallowed 
format [of the dictionary] helps to place it mentally with the Bible (alongside which it is likely 
to find itself physically), and the advertiser’s warning that ‘no home should be without it’ finds 
a ready response in the natural awe that we rightly have for our language faculty and further 
contributes to the implicit belief that the dictionary is one’s linguistic bible.”). 
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“linguistic bible.”6 Though such reverence for dictionaries is “deeply 
embedded in our culture,”7 dictionaries are often inadequate objects 
of our devotion,8 and their compilation is a decidedly human 
endeavor.9 “[W]e commonly ignore the fact,” says Professor 
Lawrence Solan, “that someone sat there and wrote the dictionary, 
and we speak as though there were only one dictionary, whose 
lexicographer got all the definitions ‘right’ in some sense that defies 
analysis.”10 
Perhaps no case in recent memory has better illustrated the 
Supreme Court’s difficulty in resolving lexical ambiguity and its 
problematic reliance upon dictionaries as aids to interpretation than 
that of Muscarello v. United States.11 At issue in Muscarello was the 
interpretation of the phrase carries a firearm and whether Congress 
intended by that term to include the notion of conveyance in a 
vehicle.12 This language became law as part of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the “Act”), and was later 
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In reaching the conclusion that 
Congress did, in fact, intend the conveyance meaning, the Court 
relied upon an extraordinary panoply of sources, including: the King 
James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and Moby Dick, as well as two 
electronic newspaper databases and several unabridged dictionaries.13 
 Not to be outdone, the dissent likewise relied upon a legal 
 
 6. QUIRK, supra note 3, at 86–87. 
 7. Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use Dictionaries, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993) 
(“[O]ur society’s reverence for dictionaries is not driven by the latest discoveries in 
psycholinguistic research. Rather, it is deeply embedded in our culture.”). 
 8. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72 (1994) (“[C]iting to dictionaries creates a 
sort of optical illusion, conveying the existence of certainty—or ‘plainness’—when appearance 
may be all there is.”). 
 9. GREEN, supra note 5, at xiv (“[D]ictionaries do not emerge from some 
lexicographical Sinai; they are the products of human beings. And human beings, try as they 
may, bring their prejudices and biases into the dictionaries they make.”). 
 10. See Solan, supra note 7, at 50. Rather than a cultural instinct, a resort to dictionaries 
in order to ascertain the plain meaning of a text is sometimes mandated by precedent. See, e.g., 
Lorillard Tobacco v. Am. Legacy, 903 A. 2d 728, 738 (Del. 2006) (“We agree that the Vice 
Chancellor’s abandonment of all dictionaries and his innovative review of how legal writers 
have used ordinary words in their texts to ascertain the plain meaning of the words are not 
supported by precedent. Under well-settled case law, Delaware courts look to dictionaries for 
assistance in determining the plain meaning of terms which are not defined in a contract.”). 
 11. 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 12. Id. at 126–27. 
 13. Id. at 127–30. 
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dictionary, several alternative translations of the Bible, and works of 
poetry,14 as well as a statement from Charles Bronson’s character in 
The Magnificent Seven,15 a quotation from the television show 
M*A*S*H,16 and one of the Supreme Court’s very few references to 
Sesame Street.17  
“As the century nears its end,” said one state court judge, “it is 
apparent that the competing opinions in [Muscarello] represent one 
of the great textualist moments of our period.”18 The case has been 
variously characterized as “an energetic textual debate”19 and as 
more of “a food fight . . . than a serious argument among 
distinguished jurists.”20 The case has likewise been said to show “a 
need for improvement in judicial reasoning about statutory 
concepts,”21 or, perhaps less generously, “it illustrates how bankrupt 
courts are when they must actually decide just what makes ordinary 
meaning ordinary.”22  
In the midst of all of the Muscarello Court’s lexical wrangling, it 
is easy to lose sight of what is at stake.23 Frank Muscarello set out to 
 
 14. Id. at 142–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 15. Id. at 144 n.6 (“You think I am brave because I carry a gun. Well, your fathers are 
much braver because they carry responsibility, for you, your brothers, your sisters, and your 
mothers.”) (quoting THE MAGNIFICENT SEVEN (The Mirisch Company, Inc. and Alpha 
Productions 1960)). 
 16. Id. (“I will not carry a gun. . . . I’ll carry your books, I’ll carry a torch, I’ll carry a 
tune, I’ll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old 
Virginia, I’ll even ‘hari-kari’ if you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!”) (quoting 
M*A*S*H: Officer of the Day (CBS television broadcast Sept. 24, 1974)). 
 17. Id. at 147 n.11 (“But as viewers of ‘Sesame Street’ will quickly recognize, ‘one of 
these things [a statute authorizing conduct] is not like the other [a statute criminalizing 
conduct].’”). One commentator has noted that these responses by the dissent were intended 
to be subtly humorous. Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68 BROOK. 
L. REV. 629, 671–72 (2003) (“The dissent suggested her sensitivity to the nuances of words 
and the care with which she chooses them when she is putting herself in opposition to her 
colleagues, but it also suggested that she is more inclined to moderate her criticism with 
playfulness than to intensify it with an aggressively hostile tone. It is characteristic of Ginsburg 
that even her strongest dissents avoid the soaring rhetoric other members of the Court often 
use.”). 
 18. Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 n.3 (Ind. 1999). 
 19. Id. at 835. 
 20. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualist’s New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 
2053 (2005). 
 21. Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and Rules in 
Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 258 (2001). 
 22. See Solan, supra note 20, at 2053. 
 23. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 140 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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sell marijuana with a handgun locked in the glove compartment of 
his truck, and that handgun remained in his glove box until the time 
of his arrest.24 By interpreting § 924(c)(1) broadly, the majority has 
extended Mr. Muscarello’s likely ten-to-sixteen month sentence—a 
sentence that included a forty-percent increase for possessing, but 
not carrying, a firearm—to a mandatory five years, plus the 
additional six-to-twelve months for his underlying drug offense.25 In 
our common law system, this means that all criminal defendants 
similarly situated26 will be brought within the ambit of this statute’s 
heightened penalty.  
In their comprehensive article on Supreme Court dictionary use, 
entitled The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress, Judge Samuel Thumma 
and Jeffrey Kirchmeier cite Muscarello as evidence that the Court’s 
dictionary usage “at times appears to lack principled guidance.”27 
Their discussion of Muscarello is framed in the broader context of an 
overarching trend to rely upon dictionaries to resolve lexical 
ambiguity28—a trend with important implications for the rule of 
law.29 Professor Lawrence Solan, referenced above, has characterized 
Muscarello as “an advertisement for the need of more serious judicial 
approaches to the meanings of statutory words.”30 He contends that 
the discussion of ordinary meaning in Muscarello is actually a search 
for two types of meaning: (1) a rule-based definition of carry derived 
 
 24. Id. at 127 (majority opinion). 
 25. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 26. The precise number of criminal defendants subjected to heightened penalty under 
the Muscarello holding is not entirely clear. One study put the number at “fewer than 200 a 
year.” See Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving 
Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 62 (2000). 
Still, if the Muscarello decision is based on fallacious reasoning about the meaning of words 
and the content of dictionaries, as I argue that it is, it would be small comfort to a federal 
prisoner spending an extra five years in prison to know that only a few hundred people each 
year are similarly situated. 
 27. Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The 
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 270–71 (1999). 
 28. Id. at 248–60 (citing statistical data demonstrating that “the decade of the 1990s 
[gave] rise to nearly half of all the opinions in the court’s two-century history where a Justice 
has relied on a dictionary”); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (1994) [hereinafter Looking It Up] (showing a nearly 
exponential increase in the Court’s reliance upon dictionaries). 
 29. See Solan, supra note 20, at 2053. 
 30. Solan, supra note 21, at 259.  
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 1:00 PM 
1915 The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress 
 1919 
from dictionaries; and (2) a prototypical meaning of carry as 
evidenced by the usage of the term.31 
This Comment will examine a question not addressed in prior 
discussions of Muscarello, which is that the majority’s discussion 
regarding the ordinary meaning of carry rests upon demonstrably 
incorrect assumptions about the content and structure of 
dictionaries. I chose the Muscarello decision for analysis, not 
necessarily because I believe it to be illustrative of the interpretive 
approach favored by the decision’s author, Justice Stephen Breyer. 
Justice Breyer’s reticence to resort to what might be viewed as 
textual pedantry is obvious from the opinion itself.32 Instead, 
Muscarello reveals common but fallacious assumptions about the 
structure and content of dictionaries—assumptions that are widely 
shared in the legal community. Having dismissed these assumptions 
as erroneous, I will then suggest an alternative method for examining 
questions of ordinary meaning—a method based in a computational 
approach to linguistic analysis known as corpus linguistics. This 
approach offers intriguing possibilities for ambiguity resolution, 
while avoiding some of the pitfalls of the Muscarello Court’s 
dictionary-based jurisprudence. 
Part I examines the traditional use of dictionaries in statutory 
interpretation. Part II addresses the majority’s argument in 
Muscarello, identifying the definitional fallacies that undermine the 
Court’s reasoning in the case. Part III examines the majority’s 
reliance upon electronic databases in determining the ordinary 
meaning of carry. Part IV will address briefly the majority’s 
purposivist argument and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. Part V proposes 
a corpus-based approach to resolving questions of lexical ambiguity. 
Part VI concludes this Comment. 
I. DICTIONARIES AND THE COURT 
Before proceeding to the arguments at issue in Muscarello, it may 
be helpful to contextualize the dramatic rise in dictionary use by the 
Court and to examine the historic role of dictionaries in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. As noted in the epigraph above, Judge Learned Hand 
stated that “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra notes 148–59 and accompanying text. 
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jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary.”33 Perhaps 
a similar sentiment cautioned judicial restraint in appealing to 
dictionaries in the earliest decades of the Republic. Prior to 1864, 
the Supreme Court cited dictionaries in only three cases,34 and this 
paucity of dictionary citation continued until the 1970s when 
dictionary citation began to grow exponentially.35  
The exponential growth in the number of times the Court cites 
dictionaries corresponds to a similarly dramatic rise in the statistical 
frequency of the words ambiguity and ambiguous in Supreme Court 
decisions.36 From the Court’s inception, through 1969, the term 
ambiguous had a statistical frequency between eleven-to-thirteen 
words per million.37 From 1970 to 2005, that number increased to 
over one-hundred words per million.38 During that same timeframe, 
the Court has increased its invocation of the so-called “Plain 
Meaning Rule” by an order of magnitude.39 Again from the Court’s 
inception, through 1969, the phrase plain meaning never had a 
statistical frequency of more than 4.2 words per million, while the 
phrase ordinary meaning never rose above 3.7 words per million.40 
From 1991 to 2005, the statistical frequency of both phrases nearly 
quadrupled from their previous highs—plain meaning rose to 15.43 
words per million and ordinary meaning rose to 15.77.41  
Correlation is not causation, but the dramatic and coincident rise 
in the Court’s reliance upon dictionaries, the Court’s discussion of 
ambiguity, and the Court’s invocation of the Plain Meaning Rule is 
striking. Justice Antonin Scalia has suggested that “[w]e live in an 
age of legislation,”42 and that “[b]y far the greatest part of what . . . 
 
 33. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 34. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 248. 
 35. See id. at 252–60; Looking It Up, supra note 28, at 1454. 
 36. See Appendix I. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Appendix II. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 13 (1998); see also, Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 527 (1947) (“Broadly speaking, the number of cases disposed of by 
opinions has not changed from term to term. But even as late as 1875 more than 40% of the 
controversies before the Court were common-law litigation, fifty years later only 5%, while 
today cases not resting on statutes are reduced almost to zero. It is therefore accurate to say 
that courts have ceased to be the primary makers of law in the sense in which they ‘legislated’ 
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all federal judges do is interpret the meaning of federal statutes and 
federal agency regulations.”43 If Justice Scalia’s assessment is correct, 
and if we may properly draw the inference from the data above that 
courts are increasingly turning to dictionaries to resolve questions of 
ambiguity and ordinary meaning, then a principled approach to use 
of dictionaries in general and the resolution of lexical ambiguity in 
particular is needed now more than ever. 
A. The Defining and Instantiating Role of Dictionaries  
Prior to this comparatively recent escalation in dictionary use by 
the Court, dictionaries were employed for their definitional 
function—they were used to aid judges in understanding the 
meaning of a forgotten or unknown term. This practice of appealing 
to dictionaries simply as memory aids was deemed a function of 
judicial notice.44  
[Words] must receive their ordinary meaning. Of that meaning the 
court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all 
words in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries 
are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and 
understanding of the court.45 
This definitional use of dictionaries by judges is at once the most 
obvious and the least controversial;46 surprisingly, it is likewise the 
least common.47 
 
the common law. It is certainly true of the Supreme Court, that almost every case has a statute 
at its heart or close to it.”). 
 43. SCALIA, supra note 42, at 13–14.  
 44. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 246–48; see also Werk v. Parker, 249 U.S. 
130, 132–33 (1918) (“[W]e deem it clear, beyond question—that the court [is] justified in 
taking judicial notice of facts that appeared so abundantly from standard works accessible in 
every considerable library.”); Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42 (1875) (“Of private and special 
facts, in trials in equity and at law, the court or jury, as the case may be, is bound carefully to 
exclude the influence of all previous knowledge. But there are many things of which judicial 
cognizance may be taken. . . . Facts of universal notoriety need not be proved. . . . Among the 
things of which judicial notice is taken are the laws of nations . . . [and] the meaning of words 
in the vernacular language . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 45. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 246–48; Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 
306–07 (1893) (holding at the nadir of the Court’s botanical competence that the tomato is a 
vegetable). 
 46. See Solan, supra note 7, at 55 (“In other cases, the dictionary is used to give the 
reader a general sense of the word, which seems to me an appropriate use of the dictionary, 
whether or not it is necessary.”); Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to 
Resort to the Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 
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Dictionaries may also serve an instantiating function, that is, they 
may be used by the court to confirm that a contested meaning has 
been employed in either speech or literature, and has thus been 
recognized as a valid meaning by lexicographers. Of this instantiating 
function, Professors Hart and Sacks said: 
Unabridged dictionaries are historical records (as reliable as the 
judgment and industry of the editors) of the meanings with which 
words have in fact been used by writers of good repute. They are 
often useful in answering hard questions of whether, in an 
appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically 
permissible.48 
In using a dictionary to instantiate a contested meaning, a judge 
searches the dictionary to determine what meanings have attained 
currency in the language at large and are thus linguistically 
permissible in a given context.49 This instantiating function may serve 
a modest channeling role in disputes involving lexical ambiguity. If a 
party suggests that an opponent’s definition for a given term is 
entirely made up, or otherwise invalid, a judge may turn to the 
dictionary to confirm that the meaning is instantiated there. In this 
 
416 (2002–2003) (“Definition is also used when the Court simply does not know (or believes 
that the reader may not know) the accurate definition of a word that it is using . . . . Needless 
to say, [this approach] is completely appropriate when ‘definition’ is the Court’s sole 
objective.”).  
 47. Hoffman, supra note 46, at 416. 
 48. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1375–76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994). 
 49. See SCALIA, supra note 42, at viii (“Words do have a limited range of meaning, and 
no interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible.”). Not every meaning of a term 
will be represented in a dictionary, and thus, if a contested meaning of a given term is not 
found there, this is not the end the inquiry. For example, in United States v. Willfong, 274 
F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2001), a man was convicted of interfering with a forest service officer after 
merely failing to comply with an officer’s order. Id. at 1298–99. Judge Noonan, writing in 
dissent, noted that of the seven senses of interfere in Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, none makes any reference to failure to comply and concludes that the court’s 
definition is anomalous. Id. at 1304–05 (Noonan, J., dissenting). This conclusion simply 
ignores the possibility that the editors of the dictionary failed to include an entirely valid, but 
rare or highly technical meaning. “An unabridged dictionary is simply an historical record, not 
necessarily all-inclusive, of the meanings which words in fact have borne, in the judgment of 
the editors, in the writings of reputable authors.” HART & SACKS, supra note 48, at 1190. 
More compelling is Judge Noonan’s argument that the portion of the United States Code at 
issue in the case has five separate provisions for failing to comply with an officer’s order. 
Willfong, 274 F.3d at 1305–06 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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respect, the dictionary functions as an “impersonal authority.”50 If 
the contested meaning appears in the dictionary, then it may be 
presumed that the meaning is, at the very least, a possible 
interpretation of a given word. At this point, the utility of the 
dictionary is at an end; parties with equally plausible meanings must 
look elsewhere to determine which contested meaning should 
control. 
This modest role for dictionaries—defining unknown terms and 
instantiating contested meanings—is consistent with both the design 
and purpose of dictionaries. No longer the arbiters of what is good 
or correct in language, most contemporary dictionaries have 
abandoned any concern about prescribing standards of usage and 
have instead taken on a descriptive approach.51 This approach has 
been characterized as follows: 
A language has at a given time a finite inventory of words, the 
meanings of which are revealed in the course of general usage. 
Since the lexicographer is as liable to be as deviant as the next man, 
he must have recourse to the usage of as many people as he can—in 
print. This last phrase embodies the proud ideal of descriptive 
objectivity; his citations (and interpretations of them) are publicly 
verifiable.52 
The implicit claim made when a given definition is included in a 
dictionary is not that a particular meaning is correct or even 
common, but that its use, in a given context, is verifiable.53  
A dictionary, it is vital to observe, never says what meaning a word 
must bear in a particular context. Nor does it ever purport to say this. 
 
 50. See HART & SACKS, supra note 48, at 1190. 
 51. LEXICOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 5 (R. R. K. Hartmann ed., 1985) 
(“[Lexicography] is above all a descriptive activity, recording existing usage rather than laying 
down prescriptive or normative rules about how words should be used or which words are to 
be avoided.”); RICHARD CHENEVIX TRENCH, ON SOME DEFICIENCIES IN OUR ENGLISH 
DICTIONARIES 4–5 (2d ed. 1857) (“A dictionary . . . is an inventory of the language . . . It is 
not the task of the maker to select the good words of the language. . . . The business which he 
has undertaken is to collect and arrange all the words, whether good or bad . . . which . . . 
those writing in the language have employed. He is an historian of it, not a critic.”); see 
Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 20, at 243 (“Today, most contemporary dictionaries are 
characterized as descriptive rather than prescriptive.”); see also HOWARD JACKSON, 
LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 66 (2002); SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART 
AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 254–261 (2d ed. 2001). 
 52. See QUIRK, supra note 3, at 87. 
 53. LEXICOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 51, at 19–20. 
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An unabridged dictionary is simply an historical record, not 
necessarily all-inclusive, of the meanings which words in fact have 
borne . . . . The editors make up this record by collecting examples 
of uses of the word to be defined, studying each use in context, and 
then forming a judgment about the meaning in that context.54 
The defining and instantiating role of dictionaries is also 
consistent with the acontextual nature of the lexical information 
presented in each dictionary entry. In defining a given term, a 
dictionary merely presents a range of possible meanings and a record 
of several ways in which the term has been employed in the past. 
One of the roles of the lexicographer is to collect records of these 
uses in a citation file,55 and to select from among them the most 
illustrative examples. A dictionary cannot tell us precisely what 
meaning a word must bear in a particular context, because the 
lexicographer cannot know a priori every context in which the term 
will be found. 
In contrast to this modest role for dictionaries, judges have 
increasingly sought to employ dictionaries for persuasive ends. They 
have done so by arguing that because multiple dictionaries define a 
term in a given way, a particular definition ought somehow to be 
controlling in a given case. Judges have also maintained that because 
a definition has been placed in a particular position in what the judge 
perceives as the dictionary’s structural hierarchy, or because the 
derivation of a term reveals that its original use was similar to the 
meaning the judge favors, the judge’s particular meaning should be 
 
 54. HART & SACKS, supra note 48, at 1190 (emphasis added); see also ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 539 at 511, n.59 (2d ed. 1982) (“The better and more 
complete the Dictionary the more numerous and varied are the usages that it records and the 
less dogmatic are its assertions as to their relative merits.”); Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 
27, at 293 (“A descriptive dictionary sets forth definitions showing what a word may mean 
generally, not what a word does mean in context.”). 
 55. See LANDAU, supra note 51, 190 (“A citation file is a selection of potential lexical 
units in the context of actual usage, drawn from a variety of written sources and often some 
spoken sources, chiefly because the context illuminates an aspect of meaning. Citations are 
clipped from the source and pasted on a card or a slip of paper, or retyped, and nowadays are 
routinely converted into a computer file by optical scanning or rekeyboarding. Citations are 
also collected to provide illustrative quotations that will be printed in the dictionary.”). 
Perhaps the most famous of these collections is the Scriptorium at Oxford University, which 
housed the slips of sample usage sent in from the Oxford English Dictionary’s more than 800 
contributors. SIMON WINCHESTER, THE MEANING OF EVERYTHING: THE STORY OF THE 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 109–16 (2003). These slips would arrive at the Scriptorium at 
the rate of nearly 1,000 per day. Id. at 112; see also LANDAU, supra note 51, at 189–206 
(describing the role of the citation file in the creation of modern dictionaries). 
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preferred. These conclusions are erroneous, not simply because they 
are at variance with the descriptive purpose for which most 
contemporary dictionaries are created, but because they rely upon 
deeply flawed assumptions about the structure and content of the 
information presented in dictionaries. Mounting judicial reliance 
upon such arguments undoubtedly led Thumma and Kirchmeier to 
conclude that—contrary to Judge Hand’s imperative—jurists are 
increasingly making a fortress out of the dictionary.56  
But the dictionary is not a fortress—its design and structure are 
no defense for jurists’ fallacious assumptions about language and 
meaning. Several of these assumptions are addressed below. 
II. DEFINITIONAL FALLACIES 
Legal proscription of the combination of illicit drug trafficking 
and firearms is hardly controversial. Few would march on the 
nation’s capital demanding the right of criminals to keep and bear 
arms while buying and selling drugs. Consequently, it comes as no 
surprise that the federal criminal code imposes heightened sanctions 
upon those who bring their guns to drug deals. The policy 
implications are fairly straightforward: “[W]hat we are trying to 
do . . . is to persuade the criminal to leave his gun at home.”57  
With this fairly uncontroversial goal in mind, the federal criminal 
code imposes “not less than five years” upon “any person who, 
during and in relation to any crime of . . . drug trafficking . . . uses 
or carries a firearm.”58 This penalty accrues “in addition to the 
punishment” for the original drug-trafficking offence. 59  
At issue in Muscarello is the question of whether this heightened 
penalty for carrying a firearm applies to those who convey their 
firearms in a vehicle as opposed to those who carry their firearms on 
their person.60 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer frames the 
dispute by stating that “[a]lthough the word ‘carry’ has many 
different meanings, only two are relevant here.”61 He then articulates 
 
 56. See generally Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 27. 
 57. 114 CONG. REC. 22,244 (1968) (statement of Rep. Randall). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 59. Id. Significantly, this penalty may be imposed even if a jury fails to convict the 
defendant for the predicate offence, that is, even if the defendant is not convicted for buying 
and selling drugs. United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 60. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1997). 
 61. Id. at 128. 
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his view that carry’s “first, or primary, meaning” reflects the notion 
of carrying as conveyance (hereafter carry1); while only a “different, 
rather special” meaning of carry reflects the notion of carrying upon 
one’s person (hereafter carry2).
62  
In order to establish that their characterization of the meaning of 
carry is the correct one, the Muscarello Court makes numerous 
appeals to dictionaries. These dictionaries are cited both for the way 
in which they define the term carry and also for the place accorded a 
given definition of carry in the overall structure of the dictionary.63 
Dictionaries are likewise employed to demonstrate that the carry1 
interpretation of carry is consistent, not just with the early usage of 
the term, but also with the term’s original usage.64 The Court insists 
that the sum of all “[t]he relevant linguistic facts are that the word 
‘carry’ in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car.”65  
These arguments by the Muscarello Court reveal tacit 
assumptions about the structure and content of dictionaries that are 
at once deeply erroneous and easily dismissed when explicitly stated. 
Because the majority’s argument relies upon these unstated premises 
that, while superficially persuasive66 and, perhaps, commonly 
believed,67 are nevertheless incorrect, I have characterized these 
assumptions as fallacies.  
A. The Sense-Ranking Fallacy 
The Court begins the analysis in a way that appears to embrace 
the modest dictionary use discussed above. The Court notes that the 
parties have stipulated “that Congress intended the phrase to convey 
its ordinary, and not some special legal, meaning.”68 The opinion 
then states that the carry1 meaning is one that “can” be employed 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 127–28, 130–31. 
 64. Id. at 128. 
 65. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 66. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 138 (11th ed. 2001) 
(“It is customary to reserve the term ‘fallacy’ for arguments that, although incorrect, are 
psychologically persuasive.”). 
 67. Id. at 137–38 (“The word ‘fallacy,’ however, as logicians use it, designates not any 
mistaken inference or false belief, but typical errors, that is, mistakes that arise commonly in 
ordinary discourse and that devastate the arguments in which they appear. . . . [F]allacies are 
dangerous because most of us are fooled by some of them on occasion.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 68. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128. 
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“as a matter of ordinary English,”69 not necessarily one that must be 
employed. This use of can suggests that the majority is attempting to 
demonstrate that carry1 is simply “linguistically permissible.”
70  
Justice Breyer soon makes clear that such definitional liberality is 
unintended. He characterizes carry1 as the “first,” “primary,” or 
“ordinary” meaning of carry, while referring to carry2 as a “different, 
special way” of using carry.71 Then, in his first sweeping appeal to 
several dictionaries, Justice Breyer says the following: 
Consider first the word’s primary meaning. The Oxford English 
Dictionary gives as its first definition “convey, originally by cart or 
wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship, on horseback, etc.” 2 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989); see also 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (1986) 
(first definition: “move while supporting (as in a vehicle or in one’s 
hands or arms)”); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 319 (2d ed. 1987) (first definition: “to 
take or support from one place to another; convey; transport”).72 
In the quotation above, Justice Breyer cites three of the most 
revered English dictionaries, noting that in each carry1 is the “first 
definition.” For each citation, he prints “first” in italics. With all of 
these firsts, it is perhaps revealing that Justice Breyer chooses the 
word primary to sum up what these quotations demonstrate. 
“Consider first the word’s primary meaning,” he says.73  
Why say primary when he has elsewhere said first? The answer 
may be that Justice Breyer is equivocating,74 that is, he is implicitly 
using primary to mean both first in sequence and first in importance. 
In the passage above, he calls attention to the fact that his suggested 
meaning of carry is listed first among several meanings in three 
dictionaries, but he elsewhere contrasts carry’s “primary meaning,” 
 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. See HART & SACKS, supra note 48. 
 71. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 66, at 163 (“[W]hen we confuse the several 
meanings of a word or phrase—accidentally or deliberately—we are using the word 
equivocally. If we do that in the context of an argument, we commit the fallacy of 
equivocation.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 1:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1928 
with what he believes to be the term’s “different” or “special 
meaning,” i.e., carry2.
75 
Consequently, Justice Breyer uses the term primary in two 
senses: First, to suggest that a particular meaning of carry 
“[o]ccur[s] or exist[s] first in a sequence,”76 and, second, to suggest 
that his particular sense of carry is of “the highest rank or 
importance.”77 The implication of the passage above is clear: Because 
carry1 occurs first in the sequence of senses it is the meaning “[o]f 
the highest rank or importance.” 
This notion that a given sense of a term may be considered 
somehow primary or ordinary or more likely to be legally operative 
than another sense simply because it is listed first in a dictionary is 
what I have called the Sense-Ranking Fallacy. The Muscarello Court 
is by no means alone in its reliance upon this fallacy. Advocates have 
credited the Sense-Ranking Fallacy,78 as have appellate judges.79 In 
 
 75. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128. 
 76. 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1989). 
 77. Id. 
 78. In a recent Supreme Court case, the respondents faulted the Solicitor General for 
employing not “primary, secondary, or even tertiary definitions of the relevant terms but . . . 
octonary ones.” Brief of Respondents Riverkeeper, Inc. at 23, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009) (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. MGA 
Entm’t, Inc., C.A. No. 06-262 S, n.7 (Dist. R.I. 2007) (“Hasbro argues that these definitions 
should be considered ‘uncommon’ because they occur toward the end of the [dictionary] 
entry’s definitional list . . . . Hasbro’s . . . claim is unpersuasive . . . . No case suggests that the 
placement of a definition in the entry list is dispositive, or even particularly relevant, to whether 
the term is generic or not.”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 
1317, 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (“Policyholders argue that the ‘first, and thus preferred’ 
definition of ‘sudden’ is ‘happening or coming unexpectedly.’ The separation of the senses of a 
word by numbers and letters, however, does not ‘evaluate or establish an enduring hierarchy of 
importance among them. The best sense is the one that most aptly fits the context of an actual 
genuine utterance.’”) (citations omitted). 
 79. Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1215 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983) (Gibson, J., 
dissenting) (“Not only the dictionaries cited by the majority but also The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, Funk & Wagnall’s, Standard Encyclopedic Dictionary, 
Webster’s New World Dictionary, and The Oxford English Dictionary all give as the first 
definition that recognized by the Supreme Court . . . and as the second definition that 
recognized by the majority in its opinion.”) (emphasis added); State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 
995 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Garff, J., dissenting) (“The majority relies on the ‘first definitions’ 
of several dictionaries to determine the definition that is ‘the most commonly accepted.’ 
However, a coordinate sub-sense of the primary definition is the following: ‘to propel through 
the air in any manner.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) 2385 
(1986); see also Webster’s Explanatory Note 12.2 and 12.4 at 17a (explaining that the various 
sub-senses do not represent ‘an enduring hierarchy,’ and that the ‘best sense is the one that 
most aptly fits the context.’”)). 
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fact, the Sense-Ranking Fallacy led one exasperated Fifth Circuit 
judge to say that 
In support of its intimation that “same” must mean “identical,” the 
majority draws a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” 
dictionary definitions. Where does this distinction come from and 
what does it mean? The majority does not base this nonsensical 
distinction on any authority. I cannot imagine that the majority 
favors interpreting statutes by choosing the first definition that 
appears in a dictionary.80  
What is the origin of this fallacy? The Sense-Ranking Fallacy is 
perhaps consistent with the basic human presumption that the most 
important things should go first in a sequence: National champions 
are listed at the top of the rankings, CEO’s and managers are listed 
at the top of the organizational chart, and gold medalists stand at the 
top of the podium. More to the point, the Sense-Ranking Fallacy is 
consistent with the simple fact that virtually no one reads the front-
matter of a dictionary,81 and consequently, most are left unaware of 
the basic content, structure, purpose, and typology of the 
dictionaries they use.82  
A careful examination of each of the dictionaries cited by the 
majority reveals that the Court’s reliance upon these sense rankings is 
fallacious.  
1. The Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
We begin with the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(“Webster’s Third”), the most cited dictionary in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.83 That Webster’s Third has come to occupy this 
position on the Court is something of a surprise, considering its 
rocky beginning. The dictionary was revolutionary when it was 
published in 1961, being among the first to adopt a purely 
descriptivist stance, including among its reference material 
colloquialisms and examples from common speech.84 The dictionary 
 
 80. Miss. Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1368–69 (5th Cir. 1993) (Reavley, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 81. See JACKSON, supra note 51, at 76–77. 
 82. P. G. J. VAN STERKENBURG, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEXICOGRAPHY 233 (2003) 
(“Dictionary editors . . . claim that it is only the reviewers who read the front matter.”); R.R.K. 
HARTMANN, TEACHING AND RESEARCHING LEXICOGRAPHY 83–86 (2001). 
 83. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 262–63.  
 84. See LANDAU, supra note 51, at 207. 
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was “roundly denounced for doing so,” even though the changes in 
the dictionary were modest and the dictionary’s editors still tended 
to favor educated writing.85 
The controversy surrounding the publication of Webster’s Third 
was not lost on the Supreme Court. In MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,86 Justice Scalia refused to accept 
that modify could mean “to make a basic or important change,” as 
suggested in the lone definition by Webster’s Third. He stated that 
“[s]uch intentional distortions, or simply careless or ignorant misuse, 
must have formed the basis for the usage that Webster’s Third, and 
Webster’s Third alone, reported.”87 Justice Scalia continued that this 
characterization “is not an unlikely hypothesis. Upon its long-
awaited appearance in 1961, Webster’s Third was widely criticized 
for its portrayal of common error as proper usage.”88 
Despite this one-time criticism, Webster’s Third is a widely 
respected authority both in academia and among the Supreme Court 
justices who cite this dictionary more than any other.89 
What then can the content and structure of Webster’s Third tell 
us about the Sense-Ranking Fallacy? Perhaps anticipating their 
readers’ cognitive predisposition to ascribe meaning to the 
dictionary’s ranking of senses, the editors of Webster’s Third provide 
this word of caution: 
The system of separating by numbers and letters reflects something 
of the semantic relationship between various senses of a word. It is 
only a lexical convenience. It does not evaluate senses or establish an 
enduring hierarchy of importance among them. The best sense is the 
one that most aptly fits the context of an actual genuine utterance. 90 
 
 85. Id. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the publication of Webster’s 
Third, see generally JAMES SLEDD & WILMA R. EBBIT, DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 
(1962); see also HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE’S 
CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS (1994). 
 86. 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 87. 512 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1994) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1452 (1981)). 
 88. Id. at 228 n.3. 
 89. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 27, at 262–63. 
 90. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (1971) (emphasis 
added). A Westlaw search reveals over 10,000 state and federal cases (the maximum search 
return) that rely upon Webster’s Third for definitions of terms. A search for the last line of the 
cautionary note above reveals five citations only. 
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This word of caution represents an express disavowal of any 
intent to rank meanings according to their semantic importance. The 
editors have here undermined any claim that a given meaning is 
primary or ordinary merely because it is ranked first. Instead, they 
have stated emphatically that the ranking of senses is “only a lexical 
convenience” and that they do not “evaluate senses” with the intent 
of “establish[ing] an enduring hierarchy.”91 The editors have also 
provided perhaps the best advice imaginable for jurists struggling 
with the interpretation of a given word in a statute, namely “[t]he 
best sense is the one that most aptly fits the context of an actual 
genuine utterance.”92 Thus, those seeking “to make a fortress” out 
of the sense ranking in Webster’s Third are sent back to the statute 
to locate contextual cues to aid in selecting the appropriate meaning.  
Setting aside this disavowal, how does Webster’s Third rank its 
senses? After all, the dictionary is alone among those cited by the 
Muscarello majority in cautioning against finding meaning in its 
ranking of senses. One might assume that these rankings are 
somehow anomalous, or follow a more haphazard course than other 
dictionaries. This is not the case. Webster’s Third ranks its senses 
historically. 
The order of senses is historical: the one known to have been first 
used in English is entered first. This reordering does not imply that 
each sense has developed from the immediately preceding 
sense. . . . Sometimes an arbitrary arrangement or rearrangement is 
the only reasonable and expedient solution to the problems of 
ordering senses.93 
The explanatory note concedes that “[s]ometimes an arbitrary 
arrangement” is necessary, but does not tell the reader how to 
distinguish arbitrary rankings from principled ones. The editors are 
here simply acknowledging that there are times when no meaningful 
or conclusive method exists for determining which meanings 
occurred first in the language. Consequently, we must assume that at 
least some of the first-place sense rankings in Webster’s Third are 
listed first for no reason at all. 
More importantly, even assuming that the instances of arbitrary 
ranking are rare, the explanatory note reveals the futility of seeking 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
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to establish a primary or ordinary meaning by looking to see which 
sense is ranked first. Such a system tells us little about current, 
ordinary usage. For example, the first sense of carry, the one favored 
by the majority, dates back to the fourteenth century CE. Does the 
majority seriously contend that we must assume that Congress 
intended this centuries-old meaning? Such intent is, of course, 
possible; but the first-place ranking of that sense in Webster’s Third 
does nothing to signal such Congressional intent. 
Imagine a statute that prohibits the public from “using or 
carrying pipes” within twenty feet of a federal courthouse. What kind 
of pipes might Congress have intended to keep away? Perhaps the 
statute was passed in response to drug paraphernalia being smuggled 
into jury rooms.94 Or perhaps it was passed to address the very real 
threat of pipe bombs.95 Maybe the statute seeks to prevent federal 
judges from routinely being upstaged by the “elementary 
deductions” of pipe-smoking, Victorian-era sleuths.  
Almost certainly the last pipe proscription that would come to 
mind is a statute designed to prevent the federal courthouse from 
being constantly regaled with Renaissance-style music, but this is 
precisely the direction in which the majority’s First-Definition-
Jurisprudence would point. Webster’s Third gives the following as its 
first definition for pipe.  
1a: a tubular wind instrument; specifically: a small fipple [sic] flute 
held in and played by the left hand b: one of the tubes of a pipe 
organ.96 
This venerable definition of pipe, the dictionary tells us, dates 
from “before the 12th century.”97 
The example illustrates the absurdity of appealing to sense 
ranking in a dictionary that ranks its definitions historically. It is 
entirely plausible that Congress sought to regulate the meaning of 
carry supported by the Muscarello majority, but it is entirely 
irrelevant that this meaning happens to correspond to the first 
definition in Webster’s Third.  
 
 94. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 95. Pipe Bomb Damages San Diego Courthouse, S.F. CHRON., May 5, 2008. 
 96. See WEBSTER’S, supra note 90, at 976. 
 97. Id. 
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2. The Oxford English Dictionary 
Perhaps out of nostalgia for his alma mater,98 Justice Breyer pays 
special attention to the sense-ranking in the Oxford English 
Dictionary (“OED”). Not only does he note that carry1 is ranked 
first among the term’s fifty-six definitions in the OED,99 but he takes 
special care to observe that carry2 is ranked “twenty-sixth.”
100 This is 
the only instance in which Justice Breyer notes the ranking given for 
carry2 as well as that for carry1. The OED, like Webster’s Third, 
ranks its senses historically.101 
A separation from the first definition to the twenty-sixth 
definition seems like a compelling lexicographical distance. What 
accounts for this wide disparity? The answer may be found in the 
explanatory note, ignored by the majority opinion, which appears at 
the top of the entry for the verb-form of carry. It says: 
From the radical meaning which includes at once ‘to remove or 
transport’, and ‘to support or bear up’ arise two main divisions, in 
one of which (I.) ‘removal’ is the chief notion, and ‘support may be 
eliminated’ . . . ; while in the other (II.) ‘support’ is the prominent 
notion, and ‘motion’ (though usually retained) may entirely 
disappear. For the former take is now largely substituted.102 
This explanatory note sheds very important light on the tacit 
assumptions of the majority opinion. There are forty-two definitions 
of the non-phrasal verb form of carry in the OED,103 but only two 
senses. The first sense (represented in the text by Roman numeral I) 
is that of carry1, and is defined consistently with the definitions 





 98. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 94 (2007). 
 99. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1997) (citing 2 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 100. Id. (citing 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 101. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxix (“[T]hat sense is placed first which was 
actually the earliest in the language: the others follow in order in which they have arisen”). 
 102. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. The remaining definitions are classified under a third Roman-numeral, not 
mentioned in the explanatory note, which includes the phrasal-verb uses of carry, such as carry 
on or carry away. Id. at 921–22. 
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I. To transport, convey while bearing up.  
 *Of literal motion or transference in space.104  
The first twenty-four definitions are classified under this single 
sense. The second sense (represented in the text by Roman numeral 
II) is that of carry2, and is defined consistently with the meaning 
favored by the Muscarello dissent: 
II. To support, sustain. 
 *With more reference to motion.105  
The next eighteen definitions of carry, including the twenty-sixth 
definition referenced by the Court, are listed under this second 
sense.106 Thus, in the broadest terms there are not twenty-six or 
forty-two senses of carry in the OED, there are only two. And why 
does the OED list one sense before the other? Simply because the 
first recorded use of carry1 was written down circa 1320 CE,
107 while 
the first recorded use of carry2 was drafted circa 1380 CE.
108  
Not only does this explanatory note reveal that there are only 
two broad senses of carry defined in the OED—senses ranked by an 
accident of history—the note likewise suggests that the first sense, 
the one favored by the majority as the “ordinary English meaning” is 
waning into obsolescence. It says that “[f]or the former (i.e. carry1), 
take is now largely substituted.” That is, the editors of the OED, 
perhaps the most venerable of all English dictionaries, suggest that 
carry1 is on its way out of the lexicon entirely.  
The majority does not define its use of the term ordinary 
meaning, and indeed, reference to the OED’s first definition (the 
legal definition) of the term ordinary would be profoundly 
unhelpful.109 Still, the OED’s entry and explanatory note on carry 
 
 104. Id. at 919. 
 105. Id. at 920. 
 106. Id. at 921–22. 
 107. Id. at 919 (“c1320 Dugdale, Monast. (1661) II. 102 De libero transitu cum 
plaustris carectis & equis . . . cariandi decimas suas et alia bona sua.”). 
 108. Id. at 921. (“c1380 WYCLIF Sel. Wks. III. 266 Carie a swerd in a scaberge.”). One 
might argue that the Wyclif reference is more germane to the statute at issue in Muscarello 
because it refers to those who “Carie a swerd in a scaberge.” Id. But there is no suggestion 
that these swerds were carried to a drug deal. 
 109. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 912 (“1. Law. Of a judge: having regular 
jurisdiction, i.e. exercising authority by virtue of office and not by special deputation; esp. 
empowered ex officio to take jurisdiction of ecclesiastical or spiritual cases.”). 
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are best cited, not to support the majority’s conclusions, but to show 
that in contemporary usage, carry1 is anything but ordinary. 
3. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 
Unabridged (the “Random House”) employs an entirely different 
method for ranking its senses than those dictionaries cited above. 
Instead of ranking its senses historically, it does so by an appeal to 
the senses’ statistical frequency: 
[T]he most frequently encountered meaning generally comes 
before less common ones. Specialized senses follow those in the 
common vocabulary, and rare, archaic, and obsolete senses are 
listed last.110 
This mode of sense-ranking ought to have important 
implications for the meaning of carry in Muscarello. Though the 
majority does not define the phrase “ordinary meaning,” that phrase 
could easily be interpreted as implying that a given meaning is the 
“most frequently encountered.”111 Does this sense-ranking system 
reveal something about the ordinary meaning of carry that the other 
sense-ranking regimes do not? Unfortunately, no.  
The problem is that the sense-ranking method employed by the 
editors of the Random House is impressionistic and unreliable. This 
is hardly a fatal criticism of the dictionary. It seems unlikely that a 
dictionary’s editors would assume that their ordering of senses would 
be deemed legally significant. Whatever the case may be, these 
impressionistic sense-rankings do not necessarily correlate with the 
statistical frequency of a given sense. 
For example, by far the most commonly employed sense of the 
word deal is that sense which suggests a particular amount: i.e., great 
deal or good deal.112 This is true both in spoken English and in 
 
 110. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED xxxii 
(2d ed. 1987). 
 111. Indeed, the OED provides the following as one of its definitions—though, 
admittedly, not its first definition—of ordinary: “2. d. Of language, usage, discourse, etc.: that 
most commonly found or attested.” 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 912 (emphasis added). 
 112. DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: 
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 37 (1998); see RANDOM HOUSE 
DICTIONARY, supra note 110, at 512 (“21. an indefinite but large quantity, amount, extent, or 
degree (usually prec. by good or great).”). 
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written texts.113 Thus, if the Random House ranks its senses by 
statistical frequency as it claims, we would expect to find this sense 
listed first. In fact, this sense is listed twenty-first.114 
What accounts for this dramatic difference between statistical 
frequency and sense ranking? The answer is that human intuition 
about the frequency of lexical items is often unreliable.115 As one 
commentator has put the issue, information about lexical frequency 
“is not susceptible to recovery via introspection.”116 This is because 
“humans tend to notice unusual occurrences more than typical 
occurrences.”117 Nor are professional linguists immune from this 
human deficiency.118 
Perhaps, in light of the growing recognition of this limitation on 
human intuition, the qualifier generally was added to the Random 
House dictionary’s explanatory note referenced above.119 In the first 
edition, this note read merely “the most frequently encountered 
meaning appears as the first definition.”120 Generally was not added 
until the publication of the second edition. Further, like the 
“sometimes . . . arbitrary arrangement” of senses in the Webster’s 
Third, the Random House fails to convey in what instances the 
dictionary departs from this “general” practice. Thus, even if we 
were to accept the Random House sense-rankings as accurate, we 
would not be able to tell, based on this qualifier, when the sense 
ranking is frequency-based and when it is not. 
 
 113. See BIBER ET AL., supra note 112, at 38. 
 114. Id. at 40. 
 115. See SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 20 (2002) (“Although a 
native speaker has experience of very much more language than is contained in even the largest 
[database], much of that experience remains hidden from introspection.”). 
 116. See TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS 12–14 (2d ed. 
2003) (“[H]uman beings have only the vaguest notion of the frequency of a construct or a 
word. Natural observation of data seems the only reliable source of evidence for such features 
as frequency. . . . There are certain types of language data which can only be gathered 
accurately from a corpus. . . . [Frequency information] is not susceptible to recovery via 
introspection.”). 
 117. See BIBER ET AL., supra note 112, at 3. 
 118. J. Charles Alderson, Judging the Frequency of English Words, 28 APPLIED 
LINGUISTICS 383, 383 (2007) (examining empirically the frequency judgments of professional 
linguists and noting that “judgments by professional linguists do not correlate highly with 
[objective measures of word frequency].”). 
 119. See supra note 72.  
 120. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED I 
(1968). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 1:00 PM 
1915 The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress 
 1937 
More importantly, the explanatory note makes no claim to a 
sense-ranking based on the most frequently occurring meaning, i.e., 
the actual sense frequency in the language at large. Rather, the note 
claims to present “the most frequently encountered meaning.”121 This 
raises an important question: Just where were these senses 
encountered? The answer is that the senses were found in the “large 
citation file” compiled by the dictionary’s editorial staff.122 For the 
purposes of statistical frequency, such a citation file is problematic in 
several respects. First, the file is compiled by hand, almost exclusively 
of written sources.123 When scanning these sources for citations, 
editors often gravitate toward the more prestigious authors, thus 
creating a skewed sample that may enshrine archaic usage.124 Second, 
subject to the same cognitive limitations discussed above, the 
dictionary’s editors are more likely to notice unusual occurrences 
than typical ones.125 The editors will be looking for sample sentences 
that are either particularly illustrative of a common meaning, or 
helpful in exemplifying a rare use.126 Finally, nothing in the 
explanatory note suggests that the Random House editors intended 
 
 121. See RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 110 (emphasis added). 
 122. See RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 120, at v; LANDAU, supra note 51. 
 123. See LANDAU, supra note 51, at 104 (2d ed. 2001) (“Even very large citation files, 
because they are collected by a process of selection, cannot be used reliably for statistical 
studies of frequency because they are apt to be unrepresentative of the language as a whole. . . . 
[C]itation readers all too often ignore common usages and give disproportionate attention to 
uncommon ones, as the seasoned birder thrills at a glimpse in the distance of a rare bird while 
the grass about him teems with ordinary domestic varieties that escape his notice. By contrast, 
a corpus that is sensibly developed will, by design, be representative, at least to a much greater 
degree than any citation file.”). 
 124. See QUIRK, supra note 3, at 88 (“Given . . . the tendency to take citations from the 
more prestigious authors, it is not difficult to see the danger of a highly skewed lexicon 
emerging from principles designed precisely in the interests of objective generality.”); HART & 
SACKS, supra note 48. 
 125. See BIBER ET AL., supra note 112, at 3.  
 126. Id. at 26 (“[C]itation slips represent only those contexts that a human reader 
happens to notice (in some cases representing only the more unusual uses.)”). In compiling 
citation files, the selection of the “more unusual uses” is not only uncontroversial, it is 
something of an industry standard. See, e.g., GEOFF BARNBROOK, DEFINING LANGUAGE: A 
LOCAL GRAMMAR OF DEFINITION SENTENCES 46 (“Even the OED, despite its 
comprehensively descriptive aims, suffers from the lack of a properly representative corpus. . . . 
Detailed instructions were given to the [citation compilers] in the later stages, but these make 
it clear that the basis of selection would not produce a fully representative sample. [They were 
told], ‘Make a quotation for every word that strikes you as rare, obsolete, old-fashioned, new, 
peculiar, or used in a particular way. . . . Make as many quotations as you can for ordinary 
words, especially when they are used significantly, and tend to by context to explain or suggest 
their own meaning.’”).  
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to establish a statistically reliable sense-ranking regime from which 
one could determine whether a given meaning is more or less 
ordinary. Thus, in appealing to the Random House sense-ranking 
regime in order to determine ordinary meaning, we are asking the 
dictionary to perform a task it was simply not designed to perform. 
This is not to suggest that it is impossible to correctly determine 
the statistical frequency of a given word or word sense. As will be 
demonstrated below, advances in computational databases and a 
linguistic methodology referred to as corpus linguistics provide tools 
for accurately determining the statistical frequency of words and 
word senses.127 Though such quantitative methods make frequency-
based sense rankings a theoretical possibility, efforts to produce such 
rankings are not without their challenges,128 and they have played no 
part in the development of any of the dictionaries cited by the 
majority in Muscarello.129 
4. Sense-ranking: a conclusion 
After examining each of the dictionaries cited by the majority, 
and after having taken note of their structure and design, it becomes 
manifestly clear that the majority’s implicit assumption that sense-
ranking should be legally significant is fallacious.  
 
 127. Indeed, several English dictionaries have been compiled with the aid of frequency 
data obtained from sophisticated electronic corpora. See, e.g., MARK DAVIES & DEE GARDNER, 
A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (2010); LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF 
CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH (4th ed. 2008). Likewise, several foreign language frequency 
dictionaries have been compiled to serve, among other things, as pedagogical resources. See, 
e.g., TIM BUCKWALTER & DILWORTH PARKINSON, A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF ARABIC 
(2010); DERYLE LONSDALE & YVON LE BRAS, A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF FRENCH 
(2009); RANDALL JONES & ERWIN TSCHIRNER, A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF GERMAN 
(2006); MARK DAVIES, A FREQUENCY DICTIONARY OF SPANISH (2006); see also, Stephen C. 
Mouritsen, A Frequency Dictionary of Arabic Newsprint (March 8, 2007) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, Brigham Young University) (on file with author). 
 128. See LANDAU, supra note 55, at 303 (“To be honest, it is still not always possible to 
distinguish frequencies of meanings with any great certitude because so much judgment is 
involved in distinguishing between closely allied meanings in the first place.”). 
 129. American dictionaries such as the Webster’s Third and the Random House have 
been particularly reluctant to incorporate information from electronic corpora into their 
design. Id. at 289–91 (“It is now apparent that some time in the 1970s the focus of innovative 
work in commercial lexicography shifted from the United States to Great Britain. . . . [I]n spite 
of showy graphics and ballyhooed usage notes, there have been very few meaningful advances 
in commercial American lexicography in the past twenty years. . . . [I]s it any wonder that 
American dictionary houses are reluctant to make the investment to build their own American 
corpus?”). 
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B. The Etymological Fallacy 
Immediately following the Court’s appeal to the sense-ranking of 
carry1
 Justice Breyer seeks to strengthen his claim by examining the 
etymology of carry.130 To show this, he cites several dictionaries 
showing that 
The origin of the word “carries” explains why the first, or basic, 
meaning of the word “carry” includes conveyance in a vehicle. See 
BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 146 (1988) (tracing the 
word from Latin “carum,” which means “car” or “cart”); 2 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 919 (tracing the word 
from Old French “carier” and the late Latin “carricare,” which 
meant to “convey in a car”).131 
As with the Sense-Ranking Fallacy discussed above, appeals to a 
term’s original use in order to determine its contemporary meaning 
are as fallacious as they are common. Sometimes courts look to a 
term’s Latin antecedents,132 sometimes to the Greek,133 and 
sometimes to both.134 But these historical antecedents are not 
necessarily related to contemporary usage. The great philologist 
Henry Sweet stated the matter as follows: 
The meaning of a word in a given period of a given language is a 
matter of usage, and the fact of its having had a certain meaning at 
some earlier period or in some cognate language does not 
necessarily afford any help in determining . . . its present 
meaning.135 
 
 130. See Solan, supra note 20, at 2051 (“To bolster its choice of dictionary, the Court 
turned to the etymology of the word ‘carry’ and found that it shares its Latin origin with the 
word ‘car’—good news for the government, assuming (without presenting a reason) that word 
origins should make a legal difference.”) (emphasis added). 
 131. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1997). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916) (“The word ‘file’ was 
not defined by Congress. No definition having been given, the etymology of the word must be 
considered and ordinary meaning applied. The word ‘file’ is derived from the Latin word 
‘filum,’ and relates to the ancient practice of placing papers on a thread or wire for safe keeping 
and ready reference”). 
 133. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F. 2d 1429, 1440 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(“The etymology of the word has direct relevance to this case. The term comes from the Greek 
parodeia, meaning ‘a song sung alongside another.’ The musical parody is thus the very 
archetype of the genre.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 n.2 (1973) (citing the Latin 
antecedents of obscene and the Greek antecedents of pornography). 
 135. HENRY SWEET, THE PRACTICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGES: A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS 
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Characterized as “one of the most pernicious of popular idées 
fixes” about language,136 the Etymological Fallacy has fallen under 
the condemnation of both linguists137 and logicians.138 “[P]recisely 
because meaning changes over time,” says one commentator, “the 
meaning of a word cannot be established from its etymology.”139 
The notion that we may accept a given meaning as valid simply 
because its etymology is consistent with our proffered meaning is 
unsustainable because it would lead to absurd results: December 
would quite literally mean October, anthology would mean a bouquet 
of flowers.140 
The Court’s appeal to etymology, like its references to the usage 
of the King James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and Moby Dick, all serve to 
undermine the claim that carry1 is the ordinary meaning of the term. 
Imagine that I were able to mimic perfectly the English of Defoe, of 
Melville, or of the Bible; or that I could speak fluently the Latin or 
Old French of those who coined the term carry. In what context 
would such speech be considered ordinary?  
 
AND LEARNERS 88 (1906). 
 136. See QUIRK, supra note 3, at 87. 
 137. ANDREW L. SIHLER, LANGUAGE HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION 131–32 (“[I]t 
cannot be overemphasized that a word’s etymology is not its meaning. And emphasis is truly 
called for, here: the etymological fallacy is immemorial, and shows no signs of exhaustion . . . it 
is enshrined in the very word etymology, from a Greek term that means ‘the study of true 
[meaning].’”); JOHN LYONS, LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 55 (1981) 
(“[T]he etymological fallacy is the assumption that the original form or meaning of a word is, 
necessarily and by virtue of that very fact, its correct form or meaning. This assumption is 
widely held. How often do we meet the argument that because such and such a word comes 
from Greek, Latin, Arabic, or whatever . . . the correct meaning of the word must be what it 
was in the language of origin! The argument is fallacious, because the tacit assumption of an 
originally true or appropriate correspondence between form and meaning, upon which the 
argument rests, cannot be substantiated.”); THOMAS PYLES & JOHN ALGEO, THE ORIGINS 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 239–40 (1993) (“The belief is widespread, 
even among some quite learned people, that the way to find out what a word means is to find 
out what it previously meant—or, preferably . . . what it originally meant. . . . [S]uch an appeal 
to etymology . . . is as unreliable as would be an appeal to spelling to determine modern 
pronunciation.”). 
 138. NIGEL WARBURTON, THINKING FROM A TO Z 59 (2000) (“It does not follow that 
because a word originally had one meaning that it will always continue to have that same 
meaning or even one directly related to it.”). 
 139. MICHAEL STUBBS, WORDS AND PHRASES: CORPUS STUDIES OF LEXICAL 
SEMANTICS 172 (2001). 
 140. See SIHLER, supra note 137, at 133. 
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Words lose their meaning; often the earliest meanings of a term 
become obsolete.141 In fact, this is precisely what the comment in the 
OED’s entry for carry suggests is happening to carry1.
142 Because 
semantic shift may render a word’s meaning unrecognizable from—
and irreconcilable with—its prior meaning, and because the OED 
suggests that this sort of semantic shift is taking place with carry1, the 
majority’s fallacious appeal to the etymology of carry is unavailing. 
C. Condorcet and Some Problems with Aggregating Definitions 
In the end, the Muscarello Court relies on seven dictionaries—
three unabridged, general-use dictionaries143; two etymological 
dictionaries144; one legal dictionary145; and one thesaurus146—in order 
to demonstrate that carry1 is the “ordinary English meaning” of 
carry. In response, Justice Ginsburg claims that “[u]nlike the Court, 
I do not think dictionaries, surveys of press reports, or the Bible tell 
us, dispositively, what ‘carries’ means embedded in § 924(c)(1).”147 
Still, the dissent is unable to resist the impulse to appeal to a 
dictionary, noting that “the only legal dictionary the Court cites . . . 
defines ‘carry arms or weapons’ restrictively.”148 In this respect, the 
Muscarello decision is a battle of dictionaries, with the majority 
prevailing by sheer force of numbers.  
In compounding all of these dictionary citations, the majority 
appears to be operating under the assumption that where one 
dictionary is good, seven are better, or rather that the combined 
expertise of the editorial boards of several dictionaries is more likely 
to reveal the correct ordinary meaning of a given term. Certainly the 
Muscarello Court is not alone in entertaining this assumption,149 nor 
 
 141. See PYLES & ALGEO, supra note 137, at 239. 
 142. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 76. 
 143. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (2d ed. 1987). 
 144. BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY (1988); OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (C. Onions ed., 1966). 
 145. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 146. WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS (1942). 
 147. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 124, 142–43 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 142 n.2 (emphasis added). 
 149. For example, on several occasions, the Justices of the Supreme Court have used the 
same three general-use dictionaries discussed above (or versions thereof) to define a single term 
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does the Court’s reliance upon the compounded expert opinions of 
these lexicographers seem terribly controversial. In fact, the notion 
that many lexicographical minds are more likely to arrive at a correct 
determination of the ordinary meaning of carry finds theoretical 
support in a well-known approach to analyzing democratic decision-
making known as the Condorcet Jury Theorem.150 The Jury 
Theorem was an effort by its creator, Nicholas de Condorcet, to 
“justify the use of majority rule and to assess the optimal size of a 
deliberative body.”151 The Theorem states that “if it is more 
probable than not that [a decision-maker] will decide in conformity 
with the truth, the more the number of [decision-makers] increases, 
the greater the probability of the truth of the decision.”152 That is, if 
a certain class of decision-makers is, say, fifty-one percent likely to 
arrive at a correct result, then the more decision-makers from this 
class are added to the group, the more the likelihood of a correct 
group decision approaches certainty.153 When applied to deliberative 
 
in a single decision. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) 
(defining because of); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2008) 
(defining oppose); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994) 
(defining modify); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14 (1994) (defining moral certainty); 
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 n.9 (1986) (defining policy). The lower federal 
courts have similarly employed this multi-dictionary approach. See, e.g., Fathauer v. United 
States, 566 F.3d 1352, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (defining employee); United States v. Loney, 
219 F.3d 281, 284 (3rd Cir. 2000) (defining connection); Commodity Trend Serv. v. 
Commodity Futures Trading, 233 F.3d 981, 989 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining customer); Miss. 
Poultry Ass’n v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 310 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994) (defining same); United 
States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1268 (4th Cir. 1993) (defining manager); Donovan v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F. 2d 315, 327 (8th Cir. 1981) (defining such as); Hartford Nat’l 
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 782, 786 n.14 (2d Cir. 1972) (defining welfare). 
Numerous state courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312, 325 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2004) (defining parent); Sy-Lene of Washington, Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail, 829 
A.2d 540, 547 (Md. 2003) (defining limit); Emp’t Sec. Comm. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 189 
N.W.2d 74, 77 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (defining lay off); Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262, 
272 (N.Y. 2008) (defining cohabit); State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St. 3d 403, 412 (Ohio 1992) 
(defining accessible); Lyon v. State, 766 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (defining 
occasion); Servais v. Port of Bellingham, 904 P.2d 1124, 1130 (Wash. 1995) (defining research 
and data). 
 150. See ADRIAN HADDOCK, ALAN MILLAR, DUNCAN PRITCHARD, SOCIAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 23–25 (2010). 
 151. Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 327, 327 (2002). 
 152. NICOLAS DE CONDORCET, CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 48–49 (Keith 
Michael Baker ed., 1976). 
 153. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 25 
(2006); DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHIC FRAMEWORK 223 
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bodies with some expertise—i.e., deliberative bodies whose 
members, because they are experts, have greater than fifty-one 
percent likelihood of reaching a correct answer—we might expect 
the Condorcet result to be amplified.154  
While the mathematics of the Condorcet Jury Theorem have 
been characterized as “unassailable,”155 the theorem’s utility is 
dependent upon several assumptions, not the least of which is the 
assumption that decision-makers will arrive at their results 
independently.156 And of course, the Theorem only has predictive 
power when its first condition is satisfied—i.e., when the likelihood 
that the decision-makers in the group will reach correct result is 
better (or worse) than average. These limitations upon the utility of 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem have important implications for the 
question of deriving ordinary meaning from aggregated dictionary 
definitions. 
1. Independence 
With regard to independence, it has been said that “[t]he history 
of English lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive and 
often successful acts of piracy.”157 While it is true that “no reputable 
dictionary today would take over entire sections of another work and 
print them verbatim,” it is likewise true that a comparison of 
common definitions across dictionaries will yield “few sharp 
discontinuities.”158 This is because “[d]ictionary editors look at each 
 
(2008) (“Suppose there are two options, and suppose each voter is independently 51 percent 
likely to choose the correct option (and 49 percent likely to choose the incorrect option): then 
among a group of 1,000 voters, the probability that the majority will vote for the correct 
option is approximately 69 percent. If the number of voters is increased to 10,000, then that 
probability rises to virtual certainty: 99.97. The probability that the majority will support the 
correct option tends toward certainty as the number of voters approaches infinity.”). 
 154. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 39 (“If experts are likely to be right, a statistical 
group of experts should have exactly the same advantage over individual experts as a statistical 
group of ordinary people has over ordinary individuals. Many expert minds are likely to be 
better than a few. A great deal of evidence supports this claim.”) (citations omitted). 
 155. See Edelman, supra note 151. 
 156. See ESTLUND, supra note 153, at 225–27. 
 157. See LANDAU, supra note 51, at 43. 
 158. Id. at 402; see GREEN, supra note 9, at 23 (“In the end any lexicographer has to face 
a basic fact: how many ways can there be of defining a given word? No reputable dictionary 
would simply reproduce material stolen from a predecessor, but it is inevitable, and generally 
accepted, that just a language demands that the word list must, while gradually expanding, 
remain relatively stable, so too must the definitions included in that list.”). 
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other’s books, and though editors form their own opinions about 
what ground should be covered, they dare not depart too far from 
the area laid out by their competitors.”159  
This reticence to depart from an established consensus may be 
explained with reference to conformity effects: the tendency of 
individuals to yield to the unanimous views of others.160 Sometimes, 
individuals conform because “they believe that unanimous others 
cannot be wrong,” at other times, individuals simply believe that 
public dissent is not worthwhile.161 In the realm of dictionary 
compilation, it is easy to see how conformity effects might influence 
a lexicographer’s choice of definitions. “The definition quality of the 
leading American and British dictionaries is high, and in the vast 
majority of instances any major variation in treatment would be 
unwise.”162 Even absent unanimity, the occurrence of a given sense 
of a word in a particularly prestigious source, like the Oxford English 
Dictionary, may result in the impulse to conform.163  
The Condorcet Jury Theorem requires “not causal 
independence, but statistical independence.”164 As long as each 
editor is as likely to arrive at a correct definition when acting alone as 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 74 (2006) (“A 
wide range of social science evidence shows conformity effects: When people are confronted 
with the views of unanimous others, they tend to yield.”); see also RICHARD H. THALER & 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS 53–73 (2008). 
 161. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 161. 
 162. See LANDAU, supra note 51, at 402. 
 163. Id. (“All American and British dictionaries . . . owe a great debt to the OED, and 
one can find numerous similarities in wording as well as in sense division between the OED 
and later generations of dictionaries.”). Sometimes the lack of independence among dictionary 
definitions is far more obvious than that produced by conformity effects. Publication houses 
often publish a single, definitive, unabridged dictionary from which many other ancillary 
dictionaries are derived. As noted by Justice Scalia in MCI Telecommunications, “[t]he 
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionaries . . . are essentially abridgments of that company’s 
Webster’s New International Dictionaries and recite that they are based upon those lengthier 
works.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 
218, 226 n.2 (1994). In Muscarello, the Court relies on both the OED and the Oxford 
Dictionary of English Etymology (“ODEE”) in order to establish the etymology of carry. But 
the original etymological materials in the OED were prepared by the same editor that provided 
this information for the ODEE, Dr. C. T. Onion. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 
ETYMOLOGY (C. T. Onions ed., 1966). Further, the ODEE was “based in the first instance on 
the OED,” though it included “further research on the etymology of English.” Id.  
 164. See ESTLUND, supra note 153, at 225. 
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she is when influenced by the decisions of others, the independence 
requirement is met.165 The question of lexicographer independence, 
if it can be answered at all, must be answered empirically. But the 
tendency of dictionary-makers to rely—for various reasons—on the 
judgments of their predecessors and the pressure to produce a 
product that conforms to market expectations counsel against the 
too hasty conclusion that their judgments are independent. 
2. Accuracy and relevance 
Even accepting that all of the dictionaries cited by the Muscarello 
Court have arrived at their definitions independently, the question 
remains as to whether the editors of these dictionaries satisfy the first 
condition of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, i.e., whether they are 
more likely than not to provide correct answers to the question of 
ordinary meaning. Here, “everything depends on whether the 
relevant experts were in a position to offer good answers on the 
questions at hand.”166  
Two problems present themselves: First, as noted above, the 
editors of the general-use dictionaries cited by the Muscarello Court 
are not in the business of establishing ordinary usage. Instead, they 
seek to instantiate the realm of permissible or possible usage.167 
Second, even if these editors affirmatively assert that a given sense of 
a word in a given context is ordinary, typical, or common, it is not 
entirely clear that we would have reason to trust their judgment. 
Information about the statistical frequency of words or word senses 
is often inaccessible through introspection,168 and, as noted above, 
linguistic training does not alleviate this common human 
deficiency.169 Consequently dictionary editors, as all human beings, 
“have only the vaguest notion of the frequency of a construct or a 
word.”170 They are likely to “give disproportionate attention to 
uncommon [uses],”171 and to favor the language use—likely the 
 
 165. Id. (“Statistical independence means that the probability of one voter, say Joe, 
getting the right answer is exactly equal to the probability of Joe getting the right answer given 
that Jane did.”). 
 166. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 41. 
 167. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 112–29 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 116. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See supra note 123. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 1:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1946 
anachronistic language use—of “prestigious authors” (like the 
Muscarello Court’s Defoe and Melville).172 The editors themselves 
may have idiosyncratic views of language and language use,173 and 
the methodologies they employ in preparing a dictionary may 
compound, rather than dampen, these deficiencies.174 
There may be circumstances in which an appeal to multiple 
dictionaries is helpful. After all, dictionaries differ both in the 
number of terms they define and in the number of senses they 
include in those definitions.175 But even if a particular sense of a 
given term is defined in every available dictionary, we could not 
conclude that this sense of a term is the ordinary meaning. In the 
end, if we are seeking to establish whether a given sense is 
linguistically permissible,176 then one dictionary may be enough. If 
we are seeking to determine which sense is the most commonly used 
in a given context, then one hundred dictionaries of the sort 
examined above would be insufficient.  
III. AN APPEAL TO A DATABASE 
Perhaps sensing that the argument for carry1 has dwelt too long 
in references to historic usage, the majority seeks to modernize the 
discussion by appealing to a pair of electronic databases. “[T]o make 
certain,” says Justice Breyer, “that there is no special ordinary 
English restriction (unmentioned in dictionaries) upon the use of 
‘carry’ . . . we have surveyed modern press usage, albeit crudely, by 
searching computerized newspaper data bases.”177 These searches 
were conducted in a New York Times database found in 
Lexis/Nexis, and a U.S. News database found in Westlaw.178 Justice 
Breyer then describes the search parameters and results as follows: 
We looked for sentences in which the words “carry,” “vehicle,” and 
“weapon” (or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of 
such sentences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps 
 
 172. See supra note 124. 
 173. See QUIRK, supra note 3. 
 174. See BIBER ET AL., supra note 113. 
 175. See supra note 49. 
 176. See supra note 48. 
 177. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1997).  
 178. Id. 
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more than one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at 
issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car. 179 
The majority’s appeal to an electronic database in order to 
determine the ordinary meaning of carry has been characterized as 
unique180 and promising.181 However, the structure of Justice 
Breyer’s search is fatally flawed, and his conclusion about the search’s 
results reveals an important weakness in the majority’s argument. 
To begin with, we must bear in mind the majority’s chief 
contention. The majority has not simply asserted that carry1 is a 
linguistically permissible reading of carry. Rather they have claimed 
that carry1 is the “ordinary” and “primary” meaning of carry, while 
carry2 is a “different, rather special” meaning.
182 The entire case turns 
on whether carry ordinarily means in a vehicle. Thus, when Justice 
Breyer conducts his search for sentences containing the words carry, 
weapon, and vehicle, he is simply phrasing his question in the form of 
his desired answer. 
Imagine that I am persuaded that people named Larry are more 
likely to be convicted of fraud. In an attempt to give my suspicion an 
air of statistical certainty, I enter the following search terms into a 
newspaper database: Larry, convicted, and fraud. What am I going to 
find? I will have undoubtedly uncovered numerous instances of guys 
named Larry being sent up for fraud. Have I proved my hypothesis?  
In light of this question-begging data-entry, the majority’s 
satisfaction with the returns is striking. “We found thousands of such 
sentences,” says Justice Breyer, “and random sampling suggests that 
many, perhaps more than one-third, are sentences used to convey 
the meaning at issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car.”183 
Justice Ginsburg rightly pounces on this conclusion, noting that 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 427 n.94 (“I have found no case besides Muscarello 
where the Court has used this method.”). Hoffman’s assessment of the Court’s methodology 
is not favorable. Id. 
 181. See Solan, supra note 20, at 2059 (“[T]he use of this method is both creative and 
promising.”). Note, The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 355, 
365 (1998) (“Empirical analysis of common usage will not by itself solve thorny questions of 
statutory interpretation, but it can provide a tool that will prove of use to . . . judicial 
interpreters.”). 
 182. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128. 
 183. Id. at 129. 
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At issue here is not “carries” at large but “carries a firearm.” The 
Court’s computer search of newspapers is revealing in this light. 
Carrying guns in a car showed up as the meaning “perhaps more 
than one-third” of the time. One is left to wonder what meaning 
showed up some two-thirds of the time.184  
Still, Justice Ginsburg’s criticism misses an important point. Even 
if one hundred percent of Justice Breyer’s search returns contained 
sentences instantiating carry1, the results would still be inconclusive. 
This is because Justice Breyer is searching for only for sentences 
containing carry, firearm, and vehicle. In these circumstances, we 
might expect to see only sentences referring to the carry1. That only 
one-third of the sentences returned contained this usage is actually 
surprising.  
If Justice Breyer’s search had included only carry and firearm, 
then a comparison of the number of sentences instantiating uses of 
carry1 against the number of sentences instantiating carry2 may have 
been illuminating. As it stands, Justice Breyer has merely confirmed 
that carry1 is sometimes used (a fact that neither the majority, nor the 
dissent would find controversial), but he has certainly not confirmed 
that carry1 is the ordinary meaning. In fact, because the search terms 
were skewed in favor of carry1, the paucity of instances of carry1 
suggests that carry1 is somewhat unusual. 
The majority’s satisfaction with these results leaves one to 
wonder not just what meaning was employed in the other two-thirds 
of the returned sentences, but also what the majority now means by 
“ordinary” and “primary” meaning.185 Certainly these returns cannot 
mean that carry1 is the most frequent or common meaning. Rather, 
they suggest that carry1 is the “different, rather special” meaning, as 
the OED comment suggests.  
IV. PURPOSIVISM AND THE DISSENT 
Leaving behind Justice Breyer’s textual argument, one feels 
compelled to pause for a moment’s reflection. If indeed we have just 
witnessed “one of the great textualist moments of our period,”186 it 
 
 184. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 185. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it 
ordinarily is used.”). 
 186. Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 n.3 (Ind. 1999). 
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is difficult to suppress the sense of irony that this textualist manifesto 
was written by an avowed purposivist. In his 2006 book, Active 
Liberty,187 Justice Breyer articulates a purpose-driven view of 
statutory interpretation188—a view that “places more emphasis on 
statutory purpose and congressional intent.”189 This interpretive 
regime encourages judges to “pay primary attention to a statute’s 
purpose in difficult cases of interpretation in which [statutory] 
language is not clear.”190 The book likewise criticizes textualism’s 
reliance on history, tradition, uncertain linguistic norms, and canons 
of interpretation.191 “Near-exclusive reliance upon canons and other 
linguistic interpretive aids in close cases,” says Justice Breyer, “can 
undermine the Constitution’s democratic objective.”192 
Why then does Justice Breyer go to such great lengths to make 
his textualist case? The decision in Muscarello has been cited for the 
proposition that because purposivist and textualist judges are 
experimenting with one another’s interpretive tools, the divide 
between them is narrowing.193 A further rationale for Justice Breyer’s 
foray into textualism is Justice Brennan’s famous Rule of Five, which 
states that “with five votes you can do anything around here!”194 In 
 
 187. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2006). 
 188. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT 
DEFINED AMERICA 216 (2007) (“In . . . Active Liberty, Breyer argued that judges in 
constitutional cases should focus on the practical consequences of their decisions—in particular 
on the likelihood that a particular decision will promote political participation, rather than 
discourage it.”); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 303 (2007) (“[I]n 2005, [Justice Breyer] did something that no justice had attempted 
in several generations—to write his own manifesto on the meaning of the Constitution. 
Characteristically, Breyer’s book . . . was hardly an airy philosophical treatise but a practical 
book by a practical man.”). 
 189. See BREYER, supra note 188, at 85. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 124–27. 
 192. Id. at 98–99. 
 193. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists? 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 86 (2006) (“[There is] potent evidence of an increasingly text-based approach in the 
opinions of contemporary purposivists on the Supreme Court.”). Id. at 88 n.64 
(“[P]urposivists on the present Court presume that a word’s ordinary or dictionary meaning 
supplies at least a useful starting point for discerning the purposes they seek.” (citing 
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–32 (1998))). For further discussion of this 
narrowing divide, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2006). 
 194. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION 
OF JUDICIAL DECISION 16 (2008). 
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the five-to-four decision of Muscarello, that fifth vote came from 
committed textualist, Justice Clarence Thomas.195 
Was the majority’s textualist experiment merely an exercise in 
consensus building? It seems clear that Justice Breyer would have 
preferred to keep the textual analysis to a minimum. He states that 
“because [the parties] argue the linguistic point at length, we too 
have looked into the matter in more than usual depth.”196 Then, 
when he arrives at his purposive argument, in which he examines 
both the statute’s legislative purpose and history, one gets the 
palpable sense of Justice Breyer’s relief. “We now explore more 
deeply the purely legal question of [what] Congress intended,” he 
says.197 
Because this examination has focused on the text-based 
reasoning of the Muscarello Court, I will not dwell on the purposive 
section of the majority’s argument in great detail, except to note that 
in addressing the statute’s purpose, the opinion cites the very broad 
statements from the floor debates, all to the effect that § 924(c)(1) 
was passed “to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a federal 
felony to leave his gun at home.”198 The majority then compares 
these statements to those which suggest some members of Congress 
had a very narrow interpretation of carry in mind.199 These are 
summarily dismissed by stating that none of them “purports to 
define the scope of the term carries.”200 In this case, characterized by 
one commentator as a “food fight,” and in which references to the 
King James Bible are answered by references to M*A*S*H, it is this 
interpretive move that is perhaps the most difficult to justify. The 
Congressional Record suggests that some members of Congress had 
 
 195. See Molot, supra note 193, at 29 (“Justices Scalia and Thomas are the only self-
identified textualists on the Supreme Court.”). 
 196. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 197. Id. at 129 (emphasis added). 
 198. Id. at 132 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 22231 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff); 114 
CONG REC. 22,243–22,244 (1968) (statutes would apply to “the man who goes out taking a 
gun to commit a crime”) (statement of Rep. Hunt); id. at 22244 (“Of course, what we are 
trying to do by these penalties is to persuade the criminal to leave his gun at home.”) 
(statement of Rep. Randall); id. at 22236 (“We are concerned . . . with having the criminal 
leave his gun at home.”) (statement of Rep. Meskill). 
 199. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 133 (“We have found an instance in which a legislator 
referred to the statute as applicable when an individual ‘has a firearm on his person’; . . . an 
instance in which a legislator speaks of ‘a criminal who takes a gun in his hand’; and a reference 
. . . to a ‘gun carried in a pocket.’” (citations omitted)). 
 200. Id. 
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a broad version of carry in mind (i.e. carry1) while other members of 
Congress envisioned the narrow version (i.e. carry2). If neither clearly 
expressed their meaning in the statute, it seems most consistent with 
the notions of fair notice and due process that this equation should 
balance out on the narrow side of the spectrum.  
Perhaps with this in mind, Justice Ginsburg makes a plea for the 
application of the Rule of Lenity, stating that “[t]he sharp division in 
the Court on the proper reading of the measure confirms, ‘[a]t the 
very least, . . . that the issue is subject to some doubt. Under these 
circumstances, we adhere to the familiar rule that, “where there is 
ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the 
defendant.”’”201 Justice Breyer dismisses this plea for lenity, stating 
that “[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from 
which aid can be derived, . . . we can make no more than a guess as 
to what Congress intended.”202 
V. A CORPUS-BASED APPROACH 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Muscarello unsatisfactorily 
addresses the meaning of carry, and in so doing throws into stark 
relief the Court’s difficulty with ordinary meaning generally. As 
noted above, the majority claims that carry1 is the “first” or 
“primary” or “ordinary English meaning” of carry and that carry2 is 
somehow a “different, rather special” meaning of carry.203 The Court 
 
 201. Id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg also 
responded to the text-based argument in her dissent, by, among other things, invoking the 
Second Amendment. Id. at 143 (“Surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s 
Second Amendment (‘keep and bear Arms’) (emphasis added) and Black’s Law Dictionary, at 
214, indicate: ‘wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for 
the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict 
with another person.’”). This equation of the meaning of carry with the meaning of bear in the 
Second Amendment would meet with what was surely an unsatisfying vindication in the 
Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2793 (2008) (“At the time 
of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to “carry.’ . . . When used with ‘arms,’ however, the 
term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation. In 
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), in the course of analyzing the meaning of 
‘carries a firearm’ in a federal criminal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that ‘[s]urely a most 
familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . .’ We think that Justice 
Ginsburg accurately captured the natural meaning of ‘bear arms.’ Although the phrase implies 
that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of ‘offensive or defensive action,’ it in no 
way connotes participation in a structured military organization.”). Justice Ginsburg joined 
both dissents in Heller. 
 202. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). 
 203. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127–28. 
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relies, among other things, upon the OED to support its claims—
even though the OED takes a contrary position. The Court likewise 
gives in to the Sense-Ranking and Etymology fallacies discussed 
above. Further, the majority seems satisfied to demonstrate “more 
than one third” of the uses of carry found in a database appear to be 
instances of carry1, even after entering a highly skewed query. Still, 
the Court insists that “[t]he relevant linguistic facts are that the word 
‘carry’ in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car.”204 But the 
claim that the ordinary sense of carry “includes” carrying in a car, is a 
far cry from the claim that this is the word’s first, primary, and 
“ordinary English” meaning. And what are the majority’s “linguistic 
facts,” but a hodgepodge of dictionary citations, literary references, 
and, as demonstrated above, fallacious inferences? 
These and other deficiencies led one commentator to conclude 
that the Muscarello Court “is not entirely sincere when claiming that 
it actually sought the ordinary meaning.”205 Instead, the same 
commentator noted that the majority’s “interpretation falls within 
the range of the statute’s possible meanings”206 of carry, but not its 
ordinary meaning.  
Though it is true that the majority’s claims are unsupported by 
the Court’s “linguistic facts,” I think, rather than insincerity, the 
Court has simply fallen victim to one of the law’s classic 
equivocations. When jurists speak of “ordinary meaning,” they 
simply are not always talking about the same thing.  
Professors Hart and Sacks state that one of the purposes of the 
dictionary is to “answer[] hard questions of whether, in an 
appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically 
permissible.”207 It is this same concept of what is “linguistically 
permissible” that seems to actuate the reasoning in Muscarello. The 
Court states only that “one can, as a matter of ordinary English, 
‘carry firearms’ in a wagon.”208 This “linguistically permissible” 
characterization of ordinary meaning also explains the majority’s 
satisfaction with finding carry1 instantiated in only one-third of the 
sentences in its database search.209  
 
 204. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 205. See Solan, supra note 20, at 2053. 
 206. Id. 
 207. HART & SACKS, supra note 48, at 1375–76. 
 208. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (emphasis added). 
 209. Id. at 129–130. 
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This approach is not without its critics. In the related case of 
Smith v. United States, Justice Scalia famously stated that “[t]he 
Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word 
can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”210 Justice Scalia has 
further observed that the Court’s job “is not to scavenge the world 
of English usage to discover whether there is any possible 
meaning.”211 “[O]ur job,” he says “is to determine . . . the ordinary 
meaning.”212 
In the end, if the Muscarello decision stands for anything, it is 
that the concept of ordinary meaning is “incompletely theorized.”213 
Though jurists commonly invoke the rule that statutory terms 
should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, there is 
no generally accepted view as to what ordinary meaning itself 
actually means, nor is there a universal justification for appealing to 
ordinary meaning.214  
Ordinary meaning has been characterized as “what . . . words 
would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English”215 or how 
words “sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of 
words.”216 These two characterizations are not identical. The skilled 
user of words and the normal speaker of English are not necessarily 
the same person. Still, both of these characterizations are grounded 
in the same principle, that ordinary meaning can be understood and 
analyzed in the context of ordinary usage.217 This notion of ordinary 
 
 210. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
in original). 
 211. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 
1735 (1994-1995). 
 214. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808 (1983) (“It is ironic that a principle designed to 
clarify should be so ambiguous.”). The same appears to be true for interpretive matters 
generally. See HART & SACKS, supra note 48, at 1169 (“The hard truth of the matter is that 
American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of 
statutory interpretation.”). 
 215. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417, 417–18 (1899) (emphasis added); see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists 
from Purposivists? 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 92 (2006) (“Textualists give primacy to the 
semantic context—evidence about the way a reasonable person conversant with relevant social 
and linguistics practices would have used the words.” (emphasis added)). 
 216. Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (1988). 
 217. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections, supra note 42, at 529 (“If a statute is written for 
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meaning as common usage is consistent with what the OED refers to 
as the linguistic definition of ordinary, which says “2. d. Of 
language, usage, discourse, etc.: that most commonly found or 
attested.”218 Almost certainly without intending to, judges who have 
invoked this “ordinary-meaning-as-common-usage” characterization 
have implicated not merely a theory of ordinary meaning, but also a 
method for its analysis. Unlike the more qualitative notions of 
ordinary meaning—like the “linguistically permissible” approach 
discussed above—the question of the “common usage” of a statutory 
term may be answered quantifiably through a linguistic methodology 
called corpus linguistics. 
A. Brief Introduction to Corpus Linguistics 
In general terms, corpus linguistics may be thought of as a 
linguistic methodology that analyzes language function and use by 
means of an electronic database called a corpus.219 A leading corpus 
linguist, Douglas Biber, has identified four unifying characteristics of 
the corpus approach: 
 
1. it is empirical, analyzing the actual pattern of use in 
natural text; 
2. it utilizes a large and principled collection of natural texts, 
known as a ‘corpus,’ as the basis for analysis; 
3. it makes extensive use of computers for analysis, using 
both automatic and interactive techniques; and 
4. it depends on both quantitative and qualitative analytical 
techniques.220 
 
The data in the corpus are considered “natural” because they 
were not elicited for the purpose of study. That is, generally no one 
 
ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress intended its words to be read 
with the minds of ordinary men. If they are addressed to specialists, they must be read by 
judges with the minds of the specialists. And so we assume that Congress uses common words 
in their popular meaning, as used in the common speech of men.”); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) (“When a statutory term is undefined, courts 
give it its ‘ordinary meaning’ or ‘common usage.’”). 
 218. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 912 (2d ed. 1989). 
 219. Douglas Biber, Corpus-based and Corpus-driven Analyses of Language Variation and 
Use in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 159 (Bernd Heine & Heiko 
Narrog eds., 2009).  
 220. See BIBER ET AL., supra note 112, at 4. 
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asks the speakers or writers whose words are represented in the 
corpus to speak or write for the purpose of subjecting their words to 
linguistic scrutiny. Instead the architect of the corpus assembles her 
collection of speech and writing samples after the fact, from 
newspapers, books, transcripts of conversations, or interviews, etc.221  
Because the speech and writing sampled in a corpus are both 
naturally occurring, we may think of a corpus as “essentially tell[ing] 
us what a language is like, and the main argument in favor of using a 
corpus is that it is a more reliable guide to language use than native 
speaker intuition.”222 Writing in 2004, Professor Lawrence Solan 
observed:  
Over the past decade, a great deal of work has been published in 
the growing field of corpus linguistics. . . . Access to computers 
now makes it relatively simple to see how words are used . . . in 
common parlance. This allows judges to easily become their own 
lexicographers. If they perform that task seriously, they stand to 
learn more about how words are ordinarily used, than by today’s 
method of fighting over which dictionary is the most 
authoritative.223 
Since that time, and certainly before, very little research has been 
published examining the legal question of “ordinary meaning” using 
a corpus-based approach.224 What follows is a brief outline of how an 
electronic corpus might be put to that task. I make no claim to any 
generalized theory of ordinary meaning. This Section will merely 
demonstrate that the question of which contested sense of a term is 
 
 221. TONY MCENERY, RICHARD XIAO & YUKIO TONO, CORPUS-BASED LANGUAGE 
STUDIES: AN ADVANCED RESOURCE BOOK 126 (2006) (“Any selection of texts is a sample. 
Whether or not a sample is ‘representative,’ however, depends first of all on the extent to 
which it is selected from the range of text types in the target population.”); TONY MCENERY & 
ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 77–82 (2001) (discussing 
sampling methods for corpus representativeness); VINCENT V. Y. OOI, COMPUTER CORPUS 
LEXICOGRAPHY 52–56 (1998).  
 222. See HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS, supra note 115, at 20. 
 223. See Solan, supra note 20, at 2059–60. 
 224. But see Brief for the Project on Government Oversight et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T Inc., No. 09-1279 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2010) (citing data 
from a number of corpora supporting the proposition that the phrase personal privacy in the 
Freedom of Information Act has reference to human privacy not corporate privacy); see also, 
Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic Perspective on 
Judicial Interpretations of “Use a Firearm,” 73 Wash. U. L. Q. 1159, 1207–09 (1995) (using 
the British National Corpus to find examples of the competing senses of the verb to use). 
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ordinary in a given context is an empirical question and the answer 
may be quantified by an appeal to a corpus. 
1. Selecting a corpus. As noted above, the chief concern in both 
corpus design and corpus selection is that of representativeness.225 In 
order for a corpus to be of any utility in the examination of ordinary 
usage, it must contain a representative sample. This sample must 
contain speech and text from the linguistic community which it 
purports to represent.  
One way to think about selecting a speech community is to 
assume that the law ought to reflect the common usage of those it 
attempts to regulate. As noted above, we might “assume that 
Congress uses common words in their popular meaning, as used in 
the common speech of men”226 and according to the understanding 
of “the citizens subject to it.”227 Applying this assumption to a 
federal statute would suggest that we are looking for a broad-based 
corpus of contemporary American language use. 
One such corpus is the Corpus of Contemporary American 
English (“COCA”), “the largest freely-available corpus of English, 
and the only large and balanced corpus of American English.”228 
The corpus contains more than 410 million words of text and is 
equally divided among spoken [English], fiction, popular 
magazines, newspapers, and academic texts. It includes 20 million 
words each year from 1990–2010 and the corpus is also updated 
every six to nine months.229 
Each of the 410 million words in the COCA is encoded for 
grammatical content or tagged.230 Nouns are electronically labeled as 
nouns, and verbs as verbs. In the COCA, this tagging process is 
 
 225. See supra note 81. The term representativeness, as used here, must not be confused 
with the decision-making heuristic of the same name from behavioral economics. See RICHARD 
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 27–31 (2008).  
 226. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections, supra note 42, at 529.  
 227. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J. 
concurring). 
 228. See CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH (COCA),  
http://www.americancorpus.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). 
 229. Id. 
 230. PAUL BAKER, ANDREW HARDIE, & TONY MCENERY, A GLOSSARY OF CORPUS 
LINGUISTICS 154 (2006) (defining tagging as an “informal term for the act of applying 
additional levels of annotation to corpus data. A tag usually consists of a code, which can be 
attached to a phoneme, morpheme, word, phrase or longer stretch of text.”). 
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automated (though other corpora employ human editors to review 
this automated electronic tagging process). 
If the linguistic community we are seeking to study is that 
governed by a federal statute, then the COCA presents itself as an 
obvious alternative for the analysis. 
2. Query design. Like any other computational system, the 
results of a corpus query are only as good as the query itself. Because 
electronic corpora have almost never before been employed in the 
search for ordinary meaning in the legal sense, there are no guiding 
principles for how to do so. A few basic considerations emerge.  
a. Syntax. The query ought to sweep in all uses of the term 
within a given grammatical class. In the COCA, this is done by 
surrounding the operative legal word (in this case carry) in brackets 
and then appending the expression .[v*], as in (1) below: 
 (1) [carry].[v*]231 
This search will reveal all the verbal uses of the term carry (e.g., 
carry, carries, carrying, carried, and one archaic use of carryed), 
while excluding other grammatical uses.232 
b. Context. Generally, statutes are only concerned with the use of 
a term in a given context. As Justice Ginsburg correctly notes in her 
dissent, at issue in Muscarello “is not ‘carries’ at large but ‘carries a 
firearm.’”233 Thus, while examining how the operative term carry is 
used generally may be an important step in framing the analysis, the 
ultimate question in the case is not the ordinary meaning of carry at 
large, but the meaning of that term when it co-occurs with 
firearm(s) and its synonyms. 
c. Dice Loading. Though context is an essential part of the 
question of ordinary meaning, some contextual information must be 
excluded. To ascertain ordinary meaning of carry a firearm, we are 
not simply asking the database to tell us how often carry is used to 
mean convey. Instead we are concerned with relative frequency, that 
is, how often carry1 is used with reference to firearms versus how 
often carry2 is used with reference to firearms. This was the fatal flaw 
in the Muscarello Court’s database analysis. If we include all three 
 
 231. I will use throughout the linguistic convention of labeling sample sentences and 
phrases with numbers in parenthesis. 
 232. Like most corpora, the COCA will exclude proper names from this search, like the 
proper name Carry. 
 233. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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operative terms, carry, firearm, and vehicle, we would expect the 
database to show us only sentences instantiating carry1. If, however, 
vehicle is excluded, we will be able to parse out the uses of carry1 and 
carry2 and determine which is more common. 
3. Concordance lines and Key Words in Context (KWIC). 
Entering the search [carry].[v*] into the COCA reveals 82,687 uses 
of the verb to carry. These returns are listed in concordance lines, 
which display the word with its surrounding context.234 In these 
concordance lines, “each occurrence of the chosen word is presented 
on a single line, with the word in the middle and the context on each 
side.”235 This type of display is referred to as a Key Word in Context 
or KWIC display.236 
In order to render the review of the ordinary meaning of carry 
more manageable than an examination of all 82,687 concordance 
lines, the COCA allows for a randomized sample to be displayed. 
Thus, by selecting the “500” icon, next to the heading “SAMPLE,” 
the corpus displays five hundred randomized instances of carry in 
KWIC format.  
4. Results from the KWIC search. The first five hundred 
randomized concordance lines reveal several different uses of the 
verb carry. What follows is not an exhaustive account of the range of 
possible meanings of carry. As discussed above, when phrasal verbs 
like carry on are included, the OED features some fifty-six separate 
definitions for carry.237 As Justice Breyer rightly noted, only two 
meanings of carry are implicated in Muscarello.238 Before proceeding 
to a discussion of those two senses, I will briefly outline the other 
senses of carry found in the corpus, but only in the broadest terms. 
The most common uses of carry found in the corpus were the 
non-physical senses of carry. These include metaphorical uses, as in 
(2), a broadcasting sense, where carry is used as a synonym for 
feature, as in (3), and an intangible sense in which what is carried is 
not a physical object, as in (4). 
(2) The term gender while often used synonymously for women did 
not carry the same political weight. 
 
 234. See BIBER ET AL., supra note 112, at 26. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Appendix III, Figure 8. 
 237. See supra notes 102–108. 
 238. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126.  
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(3) The Golf Channel now will carry early rounds and some 
tournaments. 
(4) Our legacy copper wiring just can’t carry the data to support 
HD-video streaming. 
These non-physical senses of carry account for some twenty-nine 
percent of the uses found in the sample. None of these senses of 
carry is implicated in the statute.  
Another very common use of carry is the phrasal-verb use of the 
term like carry on in (5) and carried away in (6).  
(5) Stop complaining. You’d think I was killing you the way you 
carry on. 
(6) If anything, he wants to win so badly he sometimes gets carried 
away and tries too hard.  
These senses of carry account for approximately twenty-one 
percent of the uses of carry in the sample.  
A common use of carry1 is instrumental—an agent (typically a 
person) carries an object (like a gun) by means of some sort of 
instrument (like a car, a horse, or a stretcher, etc.). Thus, carry1 
sentences typically have similar structure to (7): 
(7) <Agent> carries <object> by, with, or in an <instrument>. 
By contrast, carry2 sentences typically have a simpler structure, as 
in (8): 
(8) <Agent> carries <object>. 
A related use of carry occurs where the agent or subject of the 
sentence is itself an instrument of conveyance as in (9): 
(9) Planes with 30 or fewer seats don’t have to carry transponders 
that signal their location to air traffic control. 
Grammatically, (9) is similar to the carry2 paradigm in (8) 
because there is an agent (planes) and an object (transponders), but 
no instrument. However, in an abstract sense, the planes at issue (9) 
are being used as instruments for unstated agents. (People design the 
planes to carry or not carry transponders for some human purpose). I 
have classified all such uses of carry together under the heading of 
“inanimate” uses because the agents in such sentences are inanimate. 
These sentences account for some seven percent of the uses of carry 
in the sample. 
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Additionally, about four percent of the uses of carry were 
indeterminable from context, even using the corpus’ expanded 
context feature. Another two percent of the uses in the sample were 
mislabeled as verbs (one of the concessions a corpus architect must 
make to automated grammatical tagging). Thus, there were eleven 
nominal uses of carry, as in (10), and one adjectival use, as in (11). 
(10) Phillips, who came into the game averaging just 2.6 yards a 
carry, was impressive running inside the tackles against the Falcons. 
(11) Cost is $2,995, including suitcase and carrying bag. 
Finally, just under twenty-nine percent of the sentences in the 
sample include the carry2 sense. That these uses of carry are properly 
classified as carry2 is sometimes obvious from the sentence itself, as in 
(12), and sometimes must be inferred from context, as in (13). 
(12) On their heads or in their arms they carried their last worldly 
possessions. 
(13) “Every child must carry the stone and throw it at the 
occupier,” admonishes a 1989 leaflet.239 
In contrast, only some five percent of the sentences in the sample 
included the carry1 sense as in (14). 
(14) Donkeys are disappearing in some parts of this country. . . . 
They don’t use them as much to carry things anymore. They use 
tractors and big cars because they hold more. 




 239. There is no reference to hands, arms, or even pockets in this sentence, but the 
context suggests that these stones were physically hefted and not conveyed in a vehicle. 
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It is important to pause here and observe what these data do and 
do not tell us. My contention is not that because carry2 is far more 
common than carry1, § 924(c) ought to be interpreted with the 
carry2 meaning. Such a reading would be arbitrary. There are 
undoubtedly circumstances in which Congress employs the less 
frequent of two senses of a word. However, these data do serve to 
undermine the Court’s contention that carry1 is the word’s primary 
or ordinary meaning, while carry2 is a “different, rather special way” 
to use carry. Instead, the circumstances are reversed. When it comes 
to the support or movement of a physical object, carry2 is the 
primary or common use of carry, while carry1 is the specialized sense 
of the term. 
5. Collocation. As noted above, at issue in Muscarello “is not 
‘carries’ at large but ‘carries a firearm.’”240 While the data above 
undermine the majority’s contention that carry1 is the primary or 
ordinary meaning of carry, they do not give us a clear picture of how 
carry is used in the context of the statute—that is, when carry co-
occurs with firearm(s). One examination of Muscarello sought to 
expand the context in which carry’s use with firearm is analyzed by 
searching a database for a number of firearms, listed by name.241 
However, because both the parties and the Court framed the analysis 
in terms of how carry is ordinarily used, I think the better approach 
is to determine those synonyms of firearm with which carry 
ordinarily co-occurs. The corpus makes this possible through what is 
called a collocation display.  
“Collocation is the tendency of words to be biased in the way 
they co-occur,”242 that is, the tendency of certain words to be used in 
the same semantic environment as other words. A collocation 
program calculates collocation rates based on a node word, in our 
case, carry. The program proceeds by “count[ing] the instances of all 
words occurring within a particular span, for example, four words to 
the left of the node word and four words to the right.”243 
 
 240. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 143. 
 241. Note, The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 355, 363 
n.69 (1998) (“Search of Westlaw, USNEWS Database (Aug. 21, 1998) (search for records 
containing “(gun ‘side arm’ weapon ammunition ammo firearm shotgun rifle pistol revolver 
Uzi AK-47 handgun semiautomatic semi- automatic MAC-10 M-16 .38 .40 .44 .45 .357 9-
mm 9-millimeter Beretta (Smith /3 Wesson) (Hechler /3 Koch) Magnum Glock Colt) /s 
(trunk) & DA(1993)).”). 
 242. See HUNSTON, supra note 115, at 68. 
 243. Id. at 69. 
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Collocation statistics “can be helpful to the corpus user in 
summarizing some of the information to be found in concordance 
lines, thereby allowing more instances of a word to be 
considered.”244 Unlike the KWIC approach performed above, in 
which only 500 out of 82,687 uses of carry were examined, the 
collocation program will review every occurrence of the word in 
question and give a read-out of its collocation statistics. Put simply, 
the collocation data will show the words that are most commonly 
used with the word carry. Collocation is therefore “something of a 
short-cut to the information that could be obtained from 
concordance lines,”245 and may be used to confirm the data already 
extracted from the corpus. 
In order to display the collocation information in the COCA, 
enter [carry].[v*] under the heading “Search String,” next to the 
search field labeled “Word(s),” then click on “Collocation.”246 Then 
click “Search.” This will display the first one hundred collocates of 
carry in order of their statistical frequency. The read-out will likewise 
display the total number of sentences in which each collocate 
appears.247 I have reprinted the first one hundred collocates, together 
with their frequency ranking and number of occurrences in Appendix 
IV.248 
There are numerous purposes to which collocation displays can 
be put to use, each of them related to determining the semantic 
range of a word or words.249 For present purposes, the collocation 
display shows that firearm and four of its synonyms (together with 
their plurals) are listed among carry’s one hundred most common 
collocates.250 They are gun, handgun, rifle, and pistol. Consequently, 
in order to determine the ordinary use of carry when used with 
firearm, I have examined carry in the context of these related terms.  
 6. Carries a firearm. Having determined that the word carry 
commonly collocates with the words firearm, gun, handgun, rifle, 
 
 244. Id. at 76. 
 245. Id. at 77. 
 246. See Appendix III, Figure 9. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Appendix IV. 
 249. See, e.g., BIBER ET AL., supra note 112, at 43–51. 
 250. I have excluded weapon(s) here even though the term appears among the top-
hundred collocates of carry. Though all firearms are weapons, the reverse is not true and a 
preliminary examination of weapon(s) in the corpus suggested that many if not most of the 
weapons referenced were not firearms. 
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and pistol we can return to the KWIC display to search for sentences 
in which carry and firearm or its synonyms co-occur. This is done by 
entering [carry].[v*] into the “WORD(S)” search field and one of 






These searches will reveal every co-occurrence of any verb form 
of carry and any nominal form (singular or plural) of firearm and its 
synonyms. I have examined fifty concordance lines for each nominal 
search term, twenty-five for the singular form and twenty-five for the 
plural.  
Virtually all of the concordance lines returned in the searches 
outlined above featured uses of carry related to the physical carrying 
of an object, though it could not always be determined whether 
carry1 or carry2 was intended. Consequently, I have classified the data 
returned from these searches under four broad headings: (1) carry1 
(2) carry2 (3) either carry1 or carry2 or (4) neither carry1 nor carry2. 
These results are listed in Figure 3 below and represented graphically 




carry1 carry2 either neither 
firearm(s) 0 28 20 2
gun(s) 0 35 13 2
handgun(s) 1 24 24 1
rifle(s) 0 41 8 1
pistol 2 15 7 1
total 3 143 72 7
  
 
 251. I have excluded the plural form pistols because only the singular form was among the 
top 100 collocates of carry. 
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Like the statute at issue in Muscarello, a number of sentences in 
the sample above do not clearly implicate carry1 or carry2. These are 
instances in which either carry1 or carry2 is meant, as in (20) and 
(21). 
(20) I would like you to carry your pistol on this job. 
(21) It’s safe to assume that the handguns they carry are duly 
registered. 
In both cases, the firearms referenced could be carried either on 
one’s person or in a car. However, even resolving all such instances 
in favor of carry1 (which we have no reason to do), the data still 
demonstrate that in the overwhelming majority of cases, when carry 
is used in the context of a firearm, carrying on one’s person is the 
intended meaning.  
Therefore, if what is meant by ordinary meaning is that sense of a 
word that is most commonly employed, then the ordinary meaning 
of carry is undoubtedly carry2. This conclusion does not necessarily 
resolve the questions at issue in Muscarello, nor does it tell us how 
long Frank Muscarello ought to spend in jail. As discussed above, 
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Congress was concerned about the violence that ensues when 
criminals bring guns to drug deals. The same Congress that wanted 
to stop criminals from bringing guns to drug deals on their person, 
would have likewise wanted to stop criminals from schlepping guns 
to drug deals in their cars. This is an entirely reasonable conclusion 
and is consistent with Justice Breyer’s purposivist jurisprudence 
outlined above. An equally plausible argument made by Justice 
Ginsburg is that if Congress wishes to apply a five-year sentence 
enhancement to criminal defendant who drove to a drug deal with a 
gun locked in his glove box, Congress must say so explicitly. Still, as 
noted, the data at the very least undermine the majority’s contention 
that carry1 is the primary or ordinary meaning of carry. If the 
ultimate conclusion reached by the Court is based even in part on 
the erroneous belief that carry1 is that term’s ordinary meaning, that 
conclusion may likewise be called into question. 
B. Some Common Criticisms of the Corpus Method 
The corpus method is not without its critics and the application 
of the corpus approach to questions of ordinary meaning implicates 
several familiar criticisms. The first of these is that ultimately, no 
matter how large the data set or how well designed the corpus, the 
corpus will fail to present a full picture of the linguistic community 
analyzed. “The reason that no corpus will ever be big enough to 
embrace all the knowledge that a native speaker can access through 
introspection is that . . . the actual set of English sentences is an 
infinitely extendable one.”252 Thus, “even with the assistance of data 
from very large corpora, a native speaker can still have accurate 
intuitions that permit her to say, ‘I know that such-and-such is a 
part, or a sentence, or an expression in English, even though it’s not 
in the corpus.’”253 
 
 252. Charles Fillmore, Panel Discussion, Northwestern University/Washington 
University Law School, Law and Linguistics Seminar Conference, Evanston, Illinois, 73 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 791, 794–95 (1995) [hereinafter Panel Discussion]. This criticism of the corpus 
approach originated with Noam Chomsky, who noted: “Any natural corpus will be skewed. 
Some sentences won’t occur because they are obvious, others because they are false, still others 
because they are impolite. The corpus, if natural, will be so wildly skewed that the description 
would be no more than a mere list.” See TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS 
LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 10 (2001) (quoting Noam Chomsky, paper presented at 
the University of Texas, 3d Texas Conference on Problems of Linguistic Analysis in English 
published in STUDIES IN AMERICAN ENGLISH, at 159 (1962)). 
 253. See Panel Discussion supra note 252. 
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This criticism is less troublesome in the present circumstances. 
Although there may be uses of carry not captured by the data 
presented in the COCA, the two senses at issue in this case—carry1 
and carry2—are well represented. Likewise, while cases may arise 
where Congress has regulated certain conduct using highly 
specialized language, such is not the case in Muscarello.  
A second criticism of corpus data—particularly data derived from 
a contemporary corpus—is anachronism. After all, the earliest texts 
in the COCA date from 1990, but the statute at issue in Muscarello 
was passed in 1968. What if the use of carry has changed in the 
ensuing decades? Writing in 2003, Sydney Landau observed that 
“[m]ost existing lexicographic corpora are also limited in time, 
extending back perhaps to the 1970s, rarely much earlier. . . . There 
are historical corpora, but as of now they only scratch the surface of 
past use.”254 It has been suggested that “[u]ntil this deficit is 
supplied, the [corpus] approach . . . is not practicable for old 
statutes.”255 
Of course, one obvious response to this criticism is to observe 
that the twenty-two year span between the Act and the earliest texts 
in the COCA is at the very least shorter than the distance between 
the passage of the Act and the Court’s citations to Melville, Defoe, 
or the translators of the King James Bible, not to mention to 
centuries old citations found in the OED. However, since this 
Comment was initially accepted for publication, the architect of the 
COCA has released the Corpus of Historical American English (or 
“COHA”). The COHA is now “the largest structured corpus of 
historical English (or of any language, for that matter).”256 It allows 
users to “search more than 400 million words of text of American 
English from 1810 to 2009” by decade.257 Because the Act was 
passed in 1968, a relevant inquiry into the use of carry and 
firearm(s) contemporaneous to the passage of the Act should focus 
on uses that date from the 1960s.  
 
 254. See LANDAU, supra note 51, at 321–22. 
 255. Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2177, 2219 (2003). 
 256. Mark Davies, THE CORPUS OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN ENGLISH (COHA), 
available at http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/ (last visited Jan. 27, 201). The COHA was 
developed by Professor Mark Davies with a grant from the National Endowment for the 
Humanities. 
 257. Id. 
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Although the COHA is approximately the same size as the 
COCA, the COHA is made up of texts spanning two centuries. This 
means that the sample sentences available for a given word in a given 
decade can be limited. Consequently, instead of limiting the analysis 
to fifty sentences for each term, I have examined every sentence in 
which carry collocates with any of the synonyms of firearm(s) listed 
above during the relevant timeframe. I have used the same 
classification system for these collocations of carry and firearm(s) 
with the addition of listing the total number of sentences in which 
the terms co-occur.  
Fig. 5 
 
collocations carry1 carry2 either neither 
firearm(s) 3 0 2 1 0 
gun(s) 59 0 47 7 5 
rifle(s) 27 0 26 1 0 
pistol 12 0 10 2 0 
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The results of COHA searches are more striking than those from 
contemporary usage. Among the sample sentences returned, not a 
single occurrence of carry1 was found. Instead, nearly all of the 
references to carry in relation to firearm(s) and its synonyms were of 
the carry2 variety. This result suggests that at the time of the Act’s 
passage, carry2 was by far the more common sense of the word.  
A final criticism has to do with the notion of representativeness. 
Professor Solan has stated the problem as follows: 
When the legal system decides to rely on the ordinary meaning of a 
word, it must also determine which interpretive community’s 
understanding it wishes to adopt. This choice is made tacitly in 
legal analysis, but becomes overt when the analysis involves 
linguistic corpora because the software displays the issue on a 
screen in front of the researcher.258 
This is both a strength and a weakness of the corpus-based 
approach to ordinary meaning. The corpus can only definitively say 
how a term is ordinarily used within the corpus. Given the infinite 
permutability of human language, the corpus can never capture every 
possible human utterance, even in a narrowly-defined speech 
community. The corpus architect must therefore justify her 
conclusion that the corpus is representative based on certain 
premises—none of which can be verified by an examination of the 
complete language use of the community as a whole. On the other 
hand, unlike the judge who often “tacitly” relies upon intuition or 
introspection to determine what uses of a word are ordinary, the 
premises of the corpus architect are “overt” as are the data used to 
determine ordinary usage. 
Consider a scenario in which two judges on a panel are called 
upon to interpret a word in a statute. Judge A intuits that the 
ordinary meaning of the word is X, and finds supporting definitions 
in several dictionaries. Judge B intuits that the ordinary meaning is Y 
and likewise finds dictionary-based support. Assuming that there is 
no additional evidence as to which sense of the word should control, 
this dispute is intractable. After all, the judges’ disagreement is about 
their differing intuitions.  
Now suppose that Judge A bases her conclusion about the 
meaning of the word on a corpus-based analysis. If Judge B 
 
 258. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualist’s New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 
2059 (2005). 
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disagrees, she will have numerous “overt” bases to challenge Judge 
A’s conclusion. First, Judge B may attack the relevance of the corpus, 
noting that the data is not relevant to the speech community at issue. 
A general corpus like the COCA may not show the technical use of a 
term at issue in, say, a patent dispute. Second, Judge B may attack 
the construction of the corpus, noting that the methods employed 
by the corpus architect are not likely to represent the usage of the 
speech community the corpus claims to represent. Finally, Judge B 
may repeat the corpus-based research conducted by Judge A, using 
the same corpus data, and conclude that Judge A has reached an 
erroneous result.  
The difference between these two approaches is one of the chief 
benefits of the corpus method. The first scenario is a metaphysical 
debate; the second is an empirical one.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that “[a] problem in statutory 
construction can seriously bother courts only when there is a contest 
between probabilities of meaning.”259 If that is the case, then the 
process of interpretation may benefit from some method to quantify 
these comparative “probabilities.” 
The corpus method is not a panacea. The use of corpus data will 
not do away with disagreements as to the meaning of statutory 
terms. Instead, the corpus method removes the determination of 
ordinary meaning from the black box of the judge’s mental 
impression and renders the discussion of ordinary meaning one of 
tangible and quantifiable reality. 
Stephen C. Mouritsen 
 
 259. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527, 527–28 (1947). 
  Stephen C. Mouritsen received his JD from BYU in the spring of 2010 and an MA 
in linguistics with a corpus-linguistics emphasis from BYU in 2007. He currently serves as a law 
clerk for the Honorable Justice Thomas Rex Lee on the Utah Supreme Court. A version of this 
paper received the John S. Welch Award (First Prize) for Outstanding Legal Writing in 2010. 
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APPENDIX I: DATABASE OF DECISIONS FROM THE                                     






To analyze the frequency of use of the terms ambiguity and 
ambiguous, I have constructed a database of every U.S. Supreme 
Court decision from the inception of the Court until 2005. In 
Figure 1 above, each of the six dates (x axis) represent the 
publication of the 100th volume of the United States Reports 
(“USR”) (i.e. volume 100 was published in 1878, volume 200 in 
1905). Because these volumes will have a different number of pages 
and therefore a different number of words, I have regularized the 
data returned by calculating a words per million (“WPM”) score for 
each variable. The WPM is on the y axis. So, in the period between 
1878 and 1905 (represented by 100 U.S. 1 through 199 U.S. 617 
the word ambiguity occurred about 10.33 WPM, while ambiguous 




















Ambiguity in the Supreme Court
ambiguity
ambiguous
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Vol. #s Dates Total Word Count
1 to 99 17541–1878 22,966,526
100 to 199 1879–1905 22,550,126
200 to 299 1906–1936 16,099,370
300 to 399 1937–1970 20,470,173
400 to 499 1971–1991 27,517,650
500 to 536 1991–2005 9,006,844
 
Figure 2 above represents the number of total words in each of six 
text files, and the USR volumes represented in each. The USR 
represents a corpus of 118,610,689 words. Because the volumes are 
arranged in chronological order, a comparison of the relative 
frequency of a given word in all six files should reveal significant 
information about whether the use of the terms examined has 




1878 1905 1936 1970 1991 2005 
ambiguity 11.97 10.33 12.61 12.41 22.02 41.86 
ambiguous 12.41 11.97 13.23 24.57 61.52 100.92 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the average WPM for the terms ambiguity and 
ambiguous for the period represented on the x axis. 
 
 1.  The Dallas reporter represents volumes one through four of the USR, and contains 
numerous Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases. As such, the earliest case reported in volume one 
of the USR predates the inception of the United States Supreme Court. Anonymous, 1 U.S. (1 
Dall.) 1 (1754). 
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To analyze the frequency of use of the phrase plain meaning and its 
synonyms, I have used the same electronic database described in 




1878 1905 1936 1970 1991 2005 
plain meaning 3.27 1.91 3.11 4.2 12.43 15.43 
ordinary meaning 1.26 2.31 3.79 2.69 5.71 15.77 
natural meaning 1.52 1.51 2.8 1.56 0.62 2.33 
literal meaning 1.65 1.02 2.36 1.22 1.27 0.78 
common meaning 0.26 0 0.43 0.2 1.24 2.22 
 
Figure 5 shows the WPM for the term plain meaning and several of 
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In Figure 6, I have isolated the frequency of plain meaning and 




1878 1905 1936 1970 1991 2005 
plain meaning 3.27 1.91 3.11 4.2 12.43 15.43 
ordinary meaning 1.26 2.31 3.79 2.69 5.71 15.77 
 
Figure 7 compares the average WPM for the terms plain meaning 
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